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Jane Kap
Hingdon









BURKE'S
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS
OF THE
SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL:
WITH AN
INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE
CONCERNING TASTE.



LONDON:
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21 MAR 1947
S. FORD

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

I HAVE endeavoured to make this edition something more full and satisfactory than the first. I have sought with the utmost care, and read with equal attention, every thing which has appeared in public against my opinions; I have taken advantage of the candid liberty of my friends; and if by these means I have been better enabled to discover the imperfections of the work, the indulgence it has received, imperfect as it was, furnished me with a new motive to spare no reasonable pains for its improvement. Though I have not found sufficient reason, or what appeared to me sufficient, for making any material change in my theory, I have found necessary, in many places, to explain, illustrate, and enforce it; I have prefixed an introductory discourse concerning Taste: it is a matter curious in itself; and it leads naturally enough to the principal inquiry. This, with the other explanations, has made the work considerably larger, and by increasing its bulk, has, I am afraid, added to its faults; so that notwithstanding all my attention, it may stand in need of a yet greater share of indulgence than it required at its first appearance.

They who are accustomed to studies of this nature will expect, and they will allow, too, for many faults. They know that many of the objects of our inquiry are in themselves obscure and intricate; and that many others have been rendered so by affected refinement, or false learning; they know that there are many impediments in the subject, in the prejudice of others, and even in our own, that render it a matter of no small difficulty to shew, in a clear light, the genuine face of nature. They know that whilst the mind is intent on the general scheme of things, some particular parts must be neglected; that we must often submit the style to the matter, and frequently give up the praise of elegance, satisfied with being clear.

The characters of nature are legible, it is true; but they are not plain enough to enable those who run to read them.

We must make use of a cautious, I had almost said, a timorous, method of proceeding. We must not attempt to fly, when we can scarcely pretend to creep. In considering any complex matter, we ought to examine every distinct

contrast, which would escape us on the single greater number of the comparisons we make, general and the more certain our knowledge is as built upon a more extensive and perfect ind

If an inquiry thus carefully conducted about of discovering the truth, it may answer an end useful, in discovering to us the weakness of our standing. If it does not make us knowing, it is modest. If it does not preserve us from error least from the spirit of error; and may make of pronouncing with positiveness or with haste much labour may end in so much uncertainty.

I could wish that, in examining this theory method were pursued which I endeavoured to forming it. The objections, in my opinion, opposed, either to the several principles as they are considered, or to the justness of the conclusions drawn from them. But it is common to pass the premises and conclusion in silence, and to an objection, some poetical passage which does easily accounted for upon the principles I e

principles we employ. In reality, the subject requires a much closer attention than we dare claim from our manner of treating it.

If it should not appear on the face of the work, I must caution the reader against imagining that I intended a full dissertation on the Sublime and Beautiful. My inquiry went no farther than to the origin of these ideas. If the qualities which I have ranged under the head of the Sublime be all found consistent with each other, and all different from those which I place under the head of Beauty; and if those which compose the class of the Beautiful have the same consistency with themselves, and the same opposition to those which are classed under the denomination of the Sublime, I am in little pain whether any body chooses to follow the name I give them or not, provided he allows that what I disposed under different heads are in reality different things in nature. The use I make of the words may be blamed, as too confined, or too extended; my meaning cannot well be misunderstood.

To conclude: whatever progress may be made toward the discovery of truth in this matter, I do not repent the pains I have taken in it. The use of such inquiries may be very considerable. Whatever turns the soul inward on itself tends to concentrate its forces, and to fit it for greater and stronger flights of science. By looking into physical causes, our minds are opened and enlarged; and in this pursuit, whether we take, or whether we lose or gain, the chase is certainly of service. Cicero, true as he was at the Academic philosophy, and consequently led to reject the certainty of physical, as of every other kind of knowledge, yet freely confesses its great importance to the human understanding; '*Est animorum ingeniorumque nostrorum naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturæ.*' If we can direct the lights we derive from such exalted speculations, upon the humbler field of the imagination, whilst we investigate the springs, and trace the courses of our passions, we may not only communicate to the taste a sort of philosophical solidity, but we may reflect back on the severer sciences some of the graces and elegances of taste, without which the greatest proficiency in those sciences will always have the appearance of something illiberal.

ON TASTE.

ON a superficial view, we may seem to
widely from each other in our reasonin
less in our pleasures; but, notwithstand
ference, which I think to be rather app
real, it is probable that the standard bo
son and Taste is the same in all humar
for, if there were not some principles o
as well as of sentiment common to all n
hold could possibly be taken either of t
or their passions, sufficient to maintain t
correspondence of life. It appears, in
generally acknowledged, that with rega
and falsehood there is something fixed
people in their disputes continually a
certain tests and standards, which are
all sides, and are supposed to be establ
common nature. But there is not the s

reduced those maxims into a system. If Taste has not been so happily cultivated, it was not that the subject was barren, but that the labourers were few or negligent; for, to say the truth, there are not the same interesting motives to impel us to fix the one, which urge us to ascertain the other. And, after all, if men differ in their opinion concerning such matters, their difference is not attended with the same important consequences; else I make no doubt but that the logic of Taste, if I may be allowed the expression, might very possibly be as well digested, and we might come to discuss matters of this nature with as much certainty, as those which seem more immediately within the province of mere reason. And indeed it is very necessary, at the entrance into such an inquiry as our present, to make this point as clear as possible; for if Taste has no fixed principles, if the imagination is not affected according to some invariable and certain laws, our labour is like to be employed to very little purpose: as it must be judged a useless, if not an absurd undertaking, to lay down rules for caprice, and to set up for a legislator of whims and fancies.

The term Taste, like all other figurative terms, is not extremely accurate: the thing which we understand by it is far from a simple and determinate idea in the minds of most men, and it is therefore liable to uncertainty and confusion. I have no great opinion of a definition, the celebrated remedy for the cure of this disorder. For, when we define, we seem in danger of circumscribing nature within the bounds of our own notions, which we often take up by hazard, or embrace on trust, or form out of a limited and partial consideration of the object before us, instead of extending our ideas to take in all that nature comprehends, according to her manner

tion be what it will, in the order of things rather to follow than to precede our i which it ought to be considered as the must be acknowledged, that the methods sition and teaching may be sometimes diff on very good reason undoubtedly: but part, I am convinced that the method of which approaches most nearly to the investigation is incomparably the best; content with serving up a few barren an truths, it leads to the stock on which they tends to set the reader himself in the track tion, and to direct him into those paths the author has made his own discovery should be so happy as to have made an valuable.

But, to cut off all pretence for cavilling by the word Taste no more than that facult

there are; however paradoxical it may seem to those who, on a superficial view, imagine that there is so great a diversity of Tastes, both in kind and degree, that nothing can be more intermediate.

All the natural powers in man, that I know, that are conversant about external objects, are the Senses, the Imagination, and the Judgment. And first, with regard to the Senses. We do and we must suppose, that as the conformation of their organs are nearly or altogether the same in all men, so the manner of perceiving external objects is in all men the same, or with little difference. We are satisfied that what appears to be light to one eye appears light to another; that what seems sweet to one palate is sweet to another; that what is dark and bitter to this man is likewise dark and bitter to that: and we conclude in the same manner of great and little, hard and soft, hot and cold, rough and smooth, and indeed of all the natural qualities and affections of bodies. If we suffer ourselves to imagine that their senses present to different men different images of things, this sceptical proceeding will make every sort of reasoning on every subject vain and frivolous, even that sceptical reasoning itself, which had persuaded us to entertain a doubt concerning the agreement of our perceptions. But as there will be little doubt that bodies present similar images to the whole species, it must necessarily be allowed, that the pleasures and the pains which every object excites in one man, it must raise in all mankind, whilst it operates naturally, simply, and by its proper powers only; for, if we deny this, we must imagine that the same cause, operating in the same manner, and on subjects of the same kind, will produce different effects, which would be highly absurd. Let us first consider this

calling sweetness pleasant, and bitterness unpleasant. Here there is no diversity in their sentiments; and that there is not applied to them by the consent of all men in the metaphors which are taken from the sense of Taste. A bitter man, bitter expressions, bitter curses, a bitter taste, are terms well and strongly understood by all men, and we are altogether as well understood when we say a sweet disposition, a sweet person, a sweet condition, and the like. It is confessed, that custom and some other causes, have made many variations from the natural pleasures or pains which belong to these several Tastes; but then the faculty of distinguishing between the natural and the artificial relish remains to the very last. A man may frequently come to prefer the taste of tobacco to that of sugar, and the flavour of vinegar to that of honey; but this makes no confusion in Tastes, whilst it is sensible that the tobacco and vinegar are not

far from conferring with such a person upon Tastes, as from reasoning concerning the relations of quantity with one who should deny that all the parts together were equal to the whole. We do not call a man of this kind wrong in his notions, but absolutely mad. Exceptions of this sort, in either way, do not at all impeach our general rule, nor make us conclude that men have various principles concerning the relations of quantity, or the Taste of things. So that when it is said, Taste cannot be disputed, it can only mean, that no one can strictly answer what pleasure or pain some particular man may find from the Taste of some particular thing. This, indeed, cannot be disputed; but we may dispute, and with sufficient clearness too, concerning the things which are naturally pleasing or disagreeable to the sense. But when we talk of any peculiar or acquired relish, then we must know the habits, the prejudices, or the distempers of this particular man, and we must draw our conclusion from those.

This agreement of mankind is not confined to the Taste solely. The principle of pleasure derived from sight is the same in all. Light is more pleasing than darkness. Summer, when the earth is clad in green, when the heavens are serene and bright, is more agreeable than winter, when every thing makes a different appearance. I never remember, that any thing beautiful, whether a man, a beast, a bird, or a plant, was ever shewn, though it were to a hundred people, that they did not all immediately agree that it was beautiful, though some might have thought that it fell short of their expectation, or that other things were still finer. I believe no man thinks a goose to be more beautiful than a swan, or imagines that what they call a Frieze-

endent by the sight seen. But things so-
aneously present themselves to the palate
o to the sight, they are generally appli-
either as food or as medicine; and, f
qualities which they possess for nutritive
inal purposes, they often form the palat
rees, and by force of these associations
opium is pleasing to Turks, on account
agreeable delirium it produces. Tobac
delight of Dutchmen, as it diffuses a tc
pleasing stupefaction. Fermented spiri
our common people, because they banish
all consideration of future or present evils
these would lie absolutely neglected if the
ties had originally gone no farther than t
but all these, together with tea and coffee,
other things, have passed from the ap-
shop to our tables, and were taken for b
before they were thought of for pleas-

sure in them. There is in all men a sufficient remembrance of the original natural causes of pleasure, to enable them to bring all things offered to their senses to that standard, and to regulate their feelings and opinions by it. Suppose one had so vitiated his palate as to take more pleasure in the taste of opium than in that of butter or honey, to be presented with a bolus of squills; there is hardly any doubt but that he would prefer the butter or honey to this nauseous morsel, or to any other bitter drug to which he had been accustomed; which proves that his palate was naturally like that of other men in all things, that it is still like the palate of other men in many things, and only vitiated in some particular points. For in judging of any new thing, even of a Taste similar to that which he has been formed by habit to like, he finds his palate affected in the natural manner, and on the common principles. Thus the pleasure of all the senses, of the sight, and even of the Taste, that most ambiguous of the senses, is the same in all, high and low, learned and unlearned.

Besides the ideas, with their annexed pains and pleasures, which are presented by the sense, the mind of man possesses a sort of creative power of its own; either in representing at pleasure the images of things in the order and manner in which they were received by the senses, or in combining those images in a new manner, and according to a different order. This power is called Imagination; and to this belongs whatever is called wit, fancy, invention, and the like. But it must be observed, that the power of the imagination is incapable of producing any thing absolutely new; it can only vary the disposition of those ideas which it has received from the senses. Now, the imagination is

it can only be pleased or displeased with th
from the same principle on which the
pleased or displeased with the realities ;
sequently there must be just as close an a
in the imaginations as in the senses of
little attention will convince us that this
necessity be the case.

But in the imagination, besides the pair
sure arising from the properties of the na
ject, a pleasure is perceived from the res
which the imitation has to the original :
gination, I conceive, can have no pleasure
results from one or other of these cause
these causes operate pretty uniformly upon
because they operate by principles in nat
which are not derived from any particular
advantages. Mr. Locke very justly and fi
serves of wit, that it is chiefly conversant in
resemblances: he remarks at the same ti

set things in the world. When two distinct objects are unlike to each other, it is only what we expect; things are in their common way; and therefore they make no impression on the imagination: but when two distinct objects have a resemblance, we are struck, we attend to them, and we are pleased. The mind of man has naturally a far greater alacrity and satisfaction in tracing resemblances, than in searching for differences: because making resemblances we produce *new images*; unite, we create, we enlarge our stock: but in making distinctions we offer no food at all to the imagination; the task itself is more severe and toilsome, and what pleasure we derive from it is something of a negative and indirect nature. A piece of news is told me in the morning; this, I receive as a piece of news, as a fact added to my stock, gives me some pleasure. In the evening, I find there was nothing in it. What do I gain by it, but the dissatisfaction to find that I had been deceived upon? Hence it is that men are much more generally inclined to belief than to incredulity. It is upon this principle that the most ignorant and barbarous nations have frequently excelled in similitudes, comparisons, metaphors, and allegories, and have been weak and backward in distinguishing and sorting their ideas. And it is for a reason of this kind that Homer and the oriental writers, who are very fond of similitudes, and though they strike out such as are truly admirable, they do not take care to have them exact; that is, they are content with the general resemblance, they paint roughly, and they take no notice of the difference which may be found between the things compared. Now, as the pleasure of resemblance is that which principally flatters the imagination, all men

ceeds. A man to whom sculpture is new
barber's block, or some ordinary piece of st
he is immediately struck and pleased, bec
sees something like a human figure ; and,
taken up with this likeness, he does not a
tend to its defects. No person, I believe
first time of seeing a piece of imitation, e
Some time after we suppose that this novice
upon a more artificial work of the same nat
now begins to look with contempt on wha
mired at first ; not that he admired it even
its unlikeness to a man, but for that general
inaccurate resemblance which it bore to the
figure. What he admired at different t
these so different figures, is strictly the sam
though his knowledge is improved, his Tas
altered. Hitherto his mistake was from a
knowledge in art, and this arose from his i
ence ; but, he may be still deficient from a

in men, but upon superior knowledge, may appear from several instances. The story of the ancient painter and the shoemaker is very well known. The shoemaker set the painter right with regard to some mistakes he had made in the shoe of one of his figures, and which the painter who had not made such accurate observations on shoes, and was content with a general resemblance, had never observed. But this was no impeachment to the Taste of the painter; it only shewed some want of knowledge in the art of making shoes. Let us imagine, that an anatomist had come into the painter's working room. His piece is in general well done, the figure in question in a good attitude, and the parts well adjusted to their various movements; yet the anatomist, critical in his art, may observe the swell of some muscle not quite just in the peculiar action of the figure. Here the anatomist observes what the painter had not observed; and he passes by what the shoemaker had remarked. But a want of the last critical knowledge in anatomy no more reflected on the natural good Taste of the painter, or of any common observer of his piece, than the want of an exact knowledge in the formation of the shoe. A fine piece of a decollated head of St. John the Baptist was shewn to a Turkish emperor; he praised many things, but he observed one defect; he observed that the skin did not shrink from the wounded part of the neck. The sultan on this occasion, though his observation was very just, discovered no more natural Taste than the painter who executed this piece, or than a thousand European connoisseurs, who probably never would have made the same observation. His Turkish majesty had indeed been well acquainted with that terrible spectacle, which the others could only have repre-

figure; the sympathy proceeding from a
and affecting incident. So far as Taste is
it is nearly common to all.

In poetry and other pieces of imagination
same parity may be observed. It is true,
man is charmed with Don Bellianis, and re-
gils coldly; whilst another is transported
Æneid, and leaves Don Bellianis to
These two men seem to have Taste very
from each other; but in fact they differ
In both these pieces, which inspire such
sentiments, a tale exciting admiration is told
are full of action, both are passionate; in
voyages, battles, triumphs, and continual
of fortune. The admirer of Don Bellianis
does not understand the refined language
Æneid, who, if it was degraded into the style
Pilgrim's Progress, might feel it in all its

only solicitous for the fate of his hero, he is not in the least troubled at this extravagant blunder. For why should he be shocked at a shipwreck on the coast of Bohemia, who does not know but that Bohemia may be an island in the Atlantic ocean; and, after all, what reflection is this on the natural good Taste of the person here supposed?

So far, then, as Taste belongs to the Imagination, its principle is the same in all men; there is no difference in the manner of their being affected, nor in the causes of the affection; but in the *degree* there is a difference, which arises from two causes principally; either from a greater degree of natural sensibility, or from a closer and longer attention to the object. To illustrate this by the procedure of the senses, in which the same difference is found, let us suppose a very smooth marble table to be set before two men; they both perceive it to be smooth, and they are both pleased with it because of this quality. So far they agree. But suppose another, and after that another table, the latter still smoother than the former, to be set before them. It is now very probable that these men, who are so agreed upon what is smooth, and in the pleasure from thence, will disagree when they come to settle which table has the advantage in point of polish. Here is indeed the great difference between Tastes, when men come to compare the excess or diminution of things which are judged by degree and not by measure. Nor is it easy, when such a difference arises, to settle the point, if the excess or diminution be not glaring. If we differ in opinion about two quantities, we can have recourse to a common measure, which may decide the question with the utmost exactness; and this, I take it, is what gives mathematical knowledge a greater certainty than

acuteness of the sense equal, the greater
and habit in such things will have the
In the question about the tables, the mart
will unquestionably determine the most
But notwithstanding this want of a com
sure for settling many disputes relative to
and their representative the imaginatio
that the principles are the same in all
there is no disagreement until we come t
into the pre-eminence or difference of thi
brings us within the province of the judg

So long as we are conversant with th
qualities of things, hardly any more tha
gination seems concerned; little more
the imagination seems concerned when th
are represented, because, by the force
sympathy, they are felt in all men witho
course to reasoning, and their justness :
in every breast Love grief fear

of the judgment, which is improved by attention and by the habit of reasoning. All these make a considerable part of what are considered as the objects of Taste; and Horace sends us to the schools of philosophy and the world for our instruction in them. Whatever certainty is to be acquired in morality and the science of life; just the same degree of certainty have we in what relates to them in works of imitation. Indeed it is for the most part in our skill in manners, and in the observances of time and place, and of decency in general, which is only to be learned in those schools to which Horace recommends us, that what is called Taste by way of distinction, consists; and which is in reality no other than a more refined judgment. On the whole it appears to me, that what is called Taste, in its most general acceptation, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, and the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty concerning the various relations of these, and concerning the human passions, manners, and actions. All this is requisite to form Taste, and the groundwork of all these is the same in the human mind; for, as the senses are the great originals of all our ideas, and consequently of all our pleasures, if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, the whole groundwork of Taste is common to all, and therefore there is a sufficient foundation for a conclusive reasoning on these matters.

Whilst we consider Taste merely according to its nature and species, we shall find its principles entirely uniform; but the degree in which these principles prevail in the several individuals of mankind is altogether as different as the principles themselves are similar. For sensibility and judgment, which

such persons the most striking objects make a faint and obscure impression. There are continually in the agitation of gross and sensual pleasures, or so occupied in the low pursuit of avarice, or so heated in the chase of honor and distinction, that their minds, which had been continually to the storms of these violent and pestuous passions, can hardly be put in mind to the delicate and refined play of the imagination. These men, though from a different cause as stupid and insensible as the former; but ever either of these happen to be struck by natural elegance or greatness, or with these in any work of art, they are moved upon the same principle.

The cause of a wrong Taste is a defect of judgment. And this may arise from a natural want of understanding, in whatever the strength

standing, without inducing us to suppose that there are no settled principles of reason. And indeed; on the whole, one may observe, that there is rather less difference upon matters of Taste among mankind, than upon most of those which depend upon the naked reason; and that men are far better agreed on the excellence of a description in Virgil, than on the truth or falsehood of a theory of Aristotle.

A rectitude of judgment in the arts, which may be called a good Taste, does in a great measure depend upon sensibility, because if the mind has no bent to the pleasures of the imagination, it will never apply itself sufficiently to works of that species to acquire a competent knowledge in them. But though a degree of sensibility is requisite to form a good judgment, yet a good judgment does not necessarily arise from a quick sensibility of pleasure: it frequently happens that a very poor judge, merely by force of a greater complexional sensibility, is more affected by a very poor piece, than the best judge by the most perfect; for, as every thing new, extraordinary, grand, or passionate, is well calculated to affect such a person, and that the faults do not affect him, his pleasure is more pure and unmixed; and as it is merely a pleasure of the imagination, it is much higher than any which is derived from a rectitude of the judgment: the judgment is for the greater part employed in throwing stumbling-blocks in the way of the imagination, in dissipating the scenes of its enchantment, and in tying us down to the disagreeable yoke of our reason; for almost the only pleasure that men have in judging better than others, consists in a sort of conscious pride and superiority, which arises from thinking rightly; but then this is an indirect pleasure, a pleasure which does not

either is or can be suspected to operate
ply principles for every different appeal
less, and unphilosophical too, in a high

This matter might be pursued much
it is not the extent of the subject which
scribe our bounds, for what subject does
out to infinity? it is the nature of our
scheme, and the single point of view :
consider it, which ought to put a stop
searches.

ON THE
SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL.

PART I.

SECTION I.—NOVELTY.

THE first and the simplest emotion which we discover in the human mind is Curiosity. By curiosity I mean whatever desire we have for, or whatever pleasure we take in, novelty. We see children perpetually running from place to place to hunt out something new: they catch with great eagerness, and with very little choice, at whatever comes before them; their attention is engaged by every thing, because every thing has, in that stage of life, the charm of novelty to recommend it. But as those things, which engage us merely by their novelty, cannot attach us for any length of time, curiosity is the most superficial of all the affections; it changes its object perpetually; it has an appetite which is very sharp, but very easily satisfied; and it has always an appearance of giddiness, restlessness, and anxiety. Curiosity, from its nature, is a very active principle; it quickly runs over the greatest part of its objects, and soon exhausts the variety which is commonly to be met with in nature; the same things make frequent returns, and they return with less and less of any agreeable effect.—In short, the occurrences of life, by the time we come to know it a little, would be incapable of affecting the *mind with any other sensations than those of loath-*

they should not be exerted in those the daily vulgar use have brought into a strong familiarity. Some degree of novelty is one of the materials in every instrument works upon the mind; and curiosity works more or less with all our passions.

SECT. II.—PAIN AND PLEASURE

It seems then necessary towards motions of people advanced in life to any degree, that the objects designed for them besides their being in some measure to be capable of exciting pain and pleasure causes. Pain and pleasure are simple objects of definition. People are not mistaken in their feelings, but they are frequently wrong in the names they give to their reasonings about them. Many are

n I am called from this state into a state of ac-
pleasure, it does not appear necessary that I
d pass through the medium of any sort of pain.
such a state of indifference, or ease, or tran-
quility, or call it what you please, you were to be
only entertained with a concert of music, or
see some object of a fine shape, and bright
colours, to be represented before you; or
if your smell is gratified with the fragrance
of a rose; or if, without any previous thirst, you
to drink of some pleasant kind of wine, or to
eat of some sweetmeat without being hungry; in
all these several senses, of hearing, smelling, and
seeing, you undoubtedly find a pleasure: yet if I
am brought into the state of your mind previous to these
satisfactions, you will hardly tell me that they
do you in any kind of pain; or, having satisfied
all the several senses with their several pleasures,
you say that any pain has succeeded, though
the pleasure is absolutely over? Suppose, on the
other hand, a man in the same state of indifference,
receives a violent blow, or to drink some bitter
ale, or to have his ears wounded with some
harsh and grating sound, here is no removal of
the pleasure; and yet here is felt, in every sense which
is affected, a pain very distinguishable. It may be
said, perhaps, that the pain in these cases had its
origin from the removal of the pleasure which the
man enjoyed before, though that pleasure was of so
small a degree as to be perceived only by the re-
moval. But this seems to me a subtilty that is not
overable in nature. For if, previous to the
pain, I do not feel any actual pleasure, I have no
ground on to judge that any such thing exists; since
the only pleasure is only pleasure as it is felt. The same
may be said of pain, and with equal reason. I can

of pleasure, and of pain. Every one of
 perceive without any sort of idea of its
 any thing else. Caius is afflicted with
 cholic; this man is actually in pain: as
 upon the rack, he will feel a much greater
 but does this pain of the rack arise from the
 removal of any pleasure? or is the fit of
 a pleasure or a pain just as we are pleased to
 consider it?

SECT. III.—THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REMOVAL OF PAIN AND POSITIVE PLEASURE

WE shall carry this proposition yet a step further.
 We shall venture to propose, that pains and pleasures
 are not only not necessarily dependent on each other
 existence on their mutual diminution; but that, in reality,
 the diminution of pain does not operate like positive
 pleasure.

it is over, we relapse into indifference, or rather we fall into a soft tranquillity, which is tinged with the agreeable colour of the former sensation. I own it is not at first view so apparent, that the removal of a great pain does not resemble positive pleasure; but let us recollect in what state we have found our minds upon escaping some imminent danger, or on being released from the severity of some cruel pain. We have on such occasions found, if I am not much mistaken, the temper of our minds in a tenor very remote from that which attends the presence of positive pleasure; we have found them in a state of much sobriety, impressed with a sense of awe, in a sort of tranquillity shadowed with horror. The fashion of the countenance, and the gesture of the body on such occasions, is so correspondent to this state of mind, that any person, a stranger to the cause of the appearance, would rather judge us under some consternation, than in the enjoyment of any thing like positive pleasure.

Ὡς δ' ὅταν ἀνδρ' ἀτὴ πυκινὴ λαβῇ, ὅστ' ἐνὶ πατρὶ
Φῶτα κατακτείνῃς, ἄλλον ἐξίκετο δῆμον, ἢ
Ἀνδρὸς ἐξ ἀφνειοῦ, θαμβὸς δ' ἔχει εἰσπορόντας.

Hom. Iliad. xxiv.

As when a wretch, who, conscious of his crime,
Pursued for murder from his native clime,
Just gains some frontier, breathless, pale, amazed;
All gaze, all wonder!

This striking appearance of the man whom Homer supposes to have just escaped an imminent danger, the sort of mixed passion of terror and surprise, with which he affects the spectators, paints very strongly the manner in which we find ourselves affected upon occasions any way similar. For when we have suffered from any violent emotion, the mind naturally continues in something like the same condition, after the cause which first produced it has

its origin from the removal of pain or dan

SECT. IV.—OF DELIGHT AND PLEASURE
OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER.

BUT shall we therefore say, that the removal of pain, or its diminution, is always simply or affirm that the cessation or the lessening of pain is always attended itself with a pleasure, no means. What I advance is no more than that, first, that there are pleasures and pains of a different and independent nature; and, secondly, that the feeling which results from the ceasing or diminution of pain does not bear a sufficient resemblance to positive pleasure, to have it considered as a pleasure of the same nature, or to entitle it to be known by the same name; and, thirdly, that upon the principle, the removal or qualification of pain does not bear a resemblance to positive pain. It is certain

doubtedly positive; but the cause may be, as in this case it certainly is, a sort of *Priation*. And it is very reasonable that we should distinguish, by some term, two things so distinct in nature, as a pleasure, that is such simply, and without any relation, from that pleasure which cannot exist without a relation, and that too a relation to pain. Very extraordinary it would be, if these affections, so distinguishable in their causes, so different in their effects, should be confounded with each other, because vulgar use has ranged them under the same general title. Whenever I have occasion to speak of this species of relative pleasure, I call it *Delight*: and I shall take the best care I can to use that word in no other sense. I am satisfied the word is not commonly used in this appropriated signification; but I thought it better to take up a word already known, and to limit its signification, than to introduce a new one, which would not perhaps incorporate so well with the language. I should never have presumed the least alteration in our words, if the nature of the language, framed for the purposes of business rather than those of philosophy, and the nature of my subject that leads me out of the common track of discourse, did not in a manner necessitate me to it. I shall make use of this liberty with all possible caution. As I make use of the word *Delight* to express the sensation which accompanies the removal of pain or danger; so when I speak of positive pleasure, I shall for the most part call it simply *Pleasure*.

SECT. V.—JOY AND GRIEF.

It must be observed, that the cessation of pleasure affects the mind three ways. If it simply ceases, after having continued a proper time, the effect is

he indulges it, he loves it; but this never
in the case of actual pain, which no man
ingly endured for any considerable time.
should be willingly endured, though for
simple pleasing sensation, is not so difficult
understood. It is the nature of grief to keep
ject perpetually in its eye, to present it in
pleasurable views, to repeat all the circumstances
that attend it, even to the last minutiae
back to every particular enjoyment, to dwell
each, and to find a thousand new perfecti-
that were not sufficiently understood in
grief, the *pleasure* is still uppermost; and
tion we suffer has no resemblance to absolute
which is always odious, and which we
to shake off as soon as possible. The *Odyssey*
Homer, which abounds with so many new
affecting images, has none more striking

*Still in short intervals of pleasing we,
 Regardful of the friendly dues I owe,
 I to the glorious dead, for ever dear,
 Indulge the tribute of a grateful tear.*

On the other hand, when we recover our health, when we escape an imminent danger, is it with joy that we are affected? The sense on these occasions is far from that smooth and voluptuous satisfaction which the assured prospect of pleasure bestows. The delight which arises from the modifications of pain confesses the stock from whence it sprung, in its solid, strong, and severe nature.

SECT. VI.—ON THE PASSIONS WHICH BELONG
 TO SELF-PRESERVATION.

MOST of the ideas which are capable of making a powerful impression on the mind, whether simply of Pain or Pleasure, or of the modifications of those, may be reduced very nearly to these two heads, *self-preservation* and *society*; to the ends of one or the other of which all our passions are calculated to answer. The passions which concern self-preservation turn mostly on *pain* or *danger*. The ideas of *pain*, *sickness*, and *death*, fill the mind with strong emotions of horror; but *life*, and *health*, though they put us in a capacity of being affected with pleasure, they make no such impression by the simple enjoyment. The passions, therefore, which are conversant about the preservation of the individual, turn chiefly on *pain* and *danger*, and they are the most powerful of all the passions.

SECT. VII.—OF THE SUBLIME.

WHATEVER is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger; that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive

any pleasures which the most learned
could suggest, or than the liveliest in
the most sound and exquisitely sensu-
ous enjoy. Nay, I am in great doubt w-
could be found who would earn a l-
perfect satisfaction, at the price of
torments which justice inflicted in :
the late unfortunate regicide in F-
pain is stronger in its operation th-
death is in general a much more affe-
pain; because there are very few :
exquisite, which are not preferred :
what generally makes pain itself, if
more painful, is, that it is considered
of this kind of terrors. When dange-
too nearly, they are incapable of givi-
and are simply terrible; but at cer-
and with certain modifications, the-
they are delightful

other animals, and which we may in some sort be said to have even with the inanimate world. The passions belonging to the preservation of the individual turn wholly on pain and danger: those which belong to *generation*, have their origin in gratifications and *pleasures*: the pleasure most directly belonging to this character is of a lively character, rapturous and violent, and confessedly the highest pleasure of sense; yet the absence of this so great an enjoyment scarce amounts to an uneasiness, and, except at particular times, I do not think it affects at all. When men describe in what manner they are affected by pain and danger, they do not dwell on the pleasure of health and the comfort of security, and then lament the *loss* of these satisfactions: the whole turns upon the actual pains and horrors which they endure. But if you listen to the complaints of a forsaken lover, you observe that he insists largely on the pleasures which he enjoyed or hoped to enjoy, and on the perfection of the object of his desires; it is the *loss* which is always uppermost in his mind. The violent effects produced by love, which has sometimes been even wrought up to madness, is no objection to the rule which we seek to establish. When men have suffered their imaginations to be long affected with any idea, it so wholly engrosses them as to shut out by degrees almost every other, and to break down every partition of the mind which would confine it. Any idea is sufficient for the purpose, as is evident from the infinite variety of causes which give rise to madness; but this at most can only prove that the passion of love is capable of producing very extraordinary effects, not that its extraordinary emotions have any connexion with positive pain.

of the species, will illustrate the force yet farther; and it is, I imagine, worth mention even upon its own account. As the performance of our duties of every kind depends upon health, and the performing them with vigour depends upon health, we are very sensible of whatever threatens the destruction of health, the simple enjoyment of them is not with any real pleasure, lest, satisfied that we should give ourselves over to indolence. On the other hand, the general kind is a great purpose, and it is required that we should be animated to the pursuit of it by some incentive. It is therefore attended with pleasure: but as it is by no means our constant business, it is not fit that the pursuit of this pleasure should be attended

stated seasons : at such times it is not improbable that the sensation from the want is very troublesome, because the end must be then answered, or be missed in many, perhaps for ever; as the inclination returns only with its season.

SECT. X.—OF BEAUTY.

THE passion which belongs to generation, merely as such, is lust only. This is evident in brutes, whose passions are more unmixed, and which pursue their purposes more directly than ours. The only distinction they observe with regard to their mates, is that of sex. It is true, that they stick severally to their own species, in preference to all others. But this preference, I imagine, does not arise from any sense of beauty which they find in their species, as Mr. Addison supposes, but from a law of some other kind, to which they are subject; and this we may fairly conclude from their apparent want of choice amongst those objects to which the barriers of their species have confined them. But man, who is a creature adapted to a greater variety and intricacy of relation, connects with the general passion the idea of some *social* qualities, which direct and heighten the appetite which he has in common with all other animals; and as he is not designed like them to live at large, it is fit that he should have something to create a preference, and fix his choice, and this in general should be some sensible quality; as no other can so quickly, so powerfully, or so surely produce its effect. The object, therefore, of this mixed passion, which we call love, is the *beauty* of the *sex*. Men are carried to the sex in general, as it is the sex, and by the *common law* of nature; but they are attached to *particulars* by *personal beauty*. I call beauty a so-

have strong reasons to the contrary. Depend, in many cases, this was designed, I to discover; for I see no greater reason nexion between man and several animal attired in so engaging a manner, than bet and some others who entirely want this or possess it in a far weaker degree. But bable that Providence did not make even tinction, but with a view to some great ex we cannot perceive distinctly what it is, : dom is not our wisdom, nor our ways his

SECT. XI.—SOCIETY AND SOLITU

THE second branch of the social passio which administers to *society in general*. gard to this, I observe, that society, meciety, without any particular heightening no positive pleasure in the enjoyment; but and entire *solitude*, that is, the total and

the endearments of friendship, fill the mind with great pleasure; a temporary solitude, on the other hand, is itself agreeable. This may perhaps prove that we are creatures designed for contemplation as well as for action, since solitude as well as society has its pleasures; as, from the former observation, we may discern that an entire life of solitude contradicts the purposes of our being, since death itself is scarcely an idea of more terror.

SECT. XII.—SYMPATHY, IMITATION, AND AMBITION.

UNDER this denomination of society, the passions are of a complicated kind, and branch out into a variety of forms agreeable to that variety of ends they are to serve in the great chain of society. The three principal links in this chain are *sympathy*, *imitation*, and *ambition*.

SECT. XIII.—SYMPATHY.

It is by the first of these passions that we enter into the concerns of others; that we are moved as they are moved, and are never suffered to be indifferent spectators of almost any thing which men can do or suffer. For sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution, by which we are put into the place of another man, and affected in many respects as he is affected: so that this passion may either partake of the nature of those which regard self-preservation, and, turning upon pain, may be a source of the sublime; or it may turn upon ideas of pleasure—and then, whatever has been said of the social affections, whether they regard society in general, or only some particular modes of it, may be applicable here. It is by this principle chiefly that poetry, painting, and other affecting arts, trans-

Accordingly, the satisfaction has been attributed, first to the comfort we receive in considering that so melancholy a story is but a fiction; and next, to the contemplation of our own freedom from the evils which were presented. I am afraid it is a practice not uncommon in inquiries of this nature, to ascribe the cause of feelings which merely arise from the mechanical structure of our bodies, or from the frame and constitution of our minds, to the conclusions of the reasoning faculty on the facts presented to us; for I should imagine the influence of reason, in producing our passion, is not near so extensive as it is commonly believed.

SECT. XIV.—THE EFFECTS OF SYMPATHY
IN THE DISTRESSES OF OTHER

To examine this point concerning the effect of Tragedy in a proper manner, we must

kind. Do we not read the authentic histories of scenes of this nature with as much pleasure as romances or poems, where the incidents are fictitious? The prosperity of no empire, nor the grandeur of no king, can so agreeably affect in the reading, as the ruin of the state of Macedon, and the distress of its unhappy prince. Such a catastrophe touches us in history as much as the destruction of Troy does in fable. Our delight, in cases of this kind, is very greatly heightened, if the sufferer be some excellent person who sinks under an unworthy fortune. Scipio and Cato are both virtuous characters; but we are more deeply affected by the violent death of the one, and the ruin of the great cause he adhered to, than with the deserved triumphs and uninterrupted prosperity of the other; for terror is a passion which always produces delight when it does not press too close; and pity is a passion accompanied with pleasure, because it arises from love and social affection. Whenever we are formed by nature to any active purpose, the passion which animates us to it is attended with delight, or a pleasure of some kind, let the subject matter be what it will: and as our Creator has designed we should be united by the bond of sympathy, he has strengthened that bond by a proportionable delight; and there most where our sympathy is most wanted, in the distresses of others. If this passion were simply painful, we should shun with the greatest care all persons and places that could excite such a passion; as some who are so far gone in indolence as not to endure any strong impression, actually do. But the case is widely different with the greater part of mankind; there is no spectacle we so eagerly pursue as that of some uncommon and grievous calamity; so that whether the misfortune



by no means
eager enough
slight in seeing
our heartiest
This noble
of Europe, I be-
as to desire to
an earthquake,
self to the great-
suppose such a
what numbers
of the ruins, and
we been content
glory! Nor is it,
our immunity
right; in my own
I apprehend
of sophism, by
upon; it arises
seen what is in-
going or suffering
the cause of some
with a sword, it
we should have
fact; and yet it
being both living
time and of my
absolutely neces-
imminent hazard
offerings of others.

us to its own purposes without our concur

SECT. XV.—OF THE EFFECTS OF TRA

IT is thus in real calamities. In imi
tresses, the only difference is the pleasure
from the effects of imitation; for it is nev
fect but we can perceive it is imitation, as
principle are somewhat pleased with it.
deed in some cases we derive as much or
sure from that source than from the th
But then, I imagine, we shall be much m
we attribute any considerable part of ou
tion in tragedy to the consideration that
a deceit, and its representations no reali
nearer it approaches the reality, and the
removes us from all idea of fiction, the
fect is its power. But be its power of w

in a moment the companies of the theatre would demonstrate the comparative weakness of the imitative-arts, and proclaim the triumph of the real sympathy. I believe that this notion of our having a simple pain in the reality, yet a delight in the representation, arises from hence, that we do not sufficiently distinguish what we would by no means choose to do, from what we would be eager enough to see if it were once done. We delight in seeing things which, so far from doing, our heartiest wishes would be to see redressed. This noble capital, the pride of England and of Europe, I believe no man is so strangely wicked as to desire to see destroyed by a conflagration or an earthquake, though he should be removed himself to the greatest distance from the danger. But suppose such a fatal accident to have happened, what numbers from all parts would crowd to behold the ruins, and amongst them many who would have been content never to have seen London in its glory! Nor is it, either in real or fictitious distresses, our immunity from them which produces our delight; in my own mind I can discover nothing like it. I apprehend that this mistake is owing to a sort of sophism, by which we are frequently imposed upon; it arises from our not distinguishing between what is indeed a necessary condition to our doing or suffering any thing in general, and what is the cause of some particular act. If a man kills me with a sword, it is a necessary condition to this that we should have been both of us alive before the fact; and yet it would be absurd to say, that our being both, living creatures was the cause of his crime and of my death. So it is certain that it is absolutely necessary my life should be out of any imminent hazard before I can take a delight in the sufferings of others.

whilst we suffer ourselves; and o
when we are softened by affliction
pity even distresses which we would
place of our own.

SECT XVI.—IMITATION

THE second passion belonging to se
tion, or if you will, a desire of imita
sequently a pleasure in it. This pass
much the same cause with sympathy
pathy makes us take a concern in
feel, so this affection prompts us to c
they do; and consequently we have
imitating, and in whatever belong
merely as it is such, without any in
the reasoning faculty, but solely fro
constitution, which Providence has f
a manner as to find either pleasure

painting, and many other agreeable arts, have laid one of the principal foundations of their power. And since by its influence on our manners and our passions it is of such great consequence, I shall here venture to lay down a rule which may inform us, with a good deal of certainty, when we are to attribute the power of the arts to imitation, or to our pleasure in the skill of the imitator merely, and when to sympathy or some other cause in conjunction with it. When the object represented in poetry or painting is such as we could have no desire of seeing in the reality, then I may be sure that its power in poetry or painting is owing to the power of imitation, and to no cause operating in the thing itself. So it is with most of the pieces which the painters call still life. In these a cottage, a dunghill, the meanest and most ordinary utensils of the kitchen, are capable of giving us pleasure. But when the object of the painting or poem is such as we should run to see if real, let it affect us with what odd sort of sense it will, we may rely upon it, that the power of the poem or picture is more owing to the nature of the thing itself than to the mere effect of imitation, or to a consideration of the skill of the imitator, however excellent. Aristotle has spoken so much and so solidly upon the force of imitation in his poetics, that it makes any farther discourse upon this subject the less necessary.

SECT. XVII.—AMBITION.

ALTHOUGH imitation is one of the great instruments used by Providence in bringing our nature towards its perfection, yet if men gave themselves up to imitation entirely, and each followed the other, and so on in an eternal circle, it is easy to see that there never could be any improvement.

signalizing themselves, and that tends
whatever excites in a man the idea of th
tion so very pleasant. It has been so st
make very miserable men take comfort
were supreme in misery; and certain
where we cannot distinguish ourselves by
excellent, we begin to take a complacenc
singular infirmities, follies, or defects of
other. It is on this principle that flatter
valent; for flattery is no more than what
man's mind an idea of a preference which
Now, whatever, either on good or upon ba
tends to raise a man in his own opinion
a sort of swelling and triumph that is
grateful to the human mind; and this
never more perceived, nor operates with
than when without danger we are conce
terrible objects, the mind always claimi

PART. XXIII.—THE RECAPITULATION.

TO draw the whole of what has been said into a few distinct points :—The passions which belong to self-preservation turn on pain and danger ; they are simply painful when their causes immediately affect us ; they are delightful when we have an idea of pain and danger, without being actually in such circumstances ; this delight I have not called pleasure, because it turns on pain, and because it is different enough from any idea of positive pleasure. Whatever excites this delight I call *sublime*. The passions belonging to self-preservation are the strongest of all the passions.

The second head to which the passions are referred, with relation to their final cause, is society. There are two sorts of societies. The first is, the society of sex. The passion belonging to this is called love, and it contains a mixture of lust ; its object is the beauty of women. The other is the great society with man and all other animals. The passion subservient to this is called likewise love ; but it has no mixture of lust, and its object is beauty ; which is a name I shall apply to all such qualities in things as induce in us a sense of affection and tenderness, or some other passion the most nearly resembling these. The passion of love has its rise in positive pleasure ; it is, like all things which grow out of pleasure, capable of being mixed with a mode of uneasiness, that is, when an idea of its object is excited in the mind with an idea at the same time of having irretrievably lost it. This mixed sense of pleasure I have not called *poetic*, because it turns upon actual pleasure, and because it is, both in its cause, and in most of its effects, of a nature altogether different.

on pain or pleasure; but with the
mentioned in some cases in Sect. XI.
tation and preference, nothing more n

SECT. XIX.—THE CONCLUS

I BELIEVE that an attempt to range a
some of our most leading passions wo
preparative to such an inquiry as we
make in the ensuing discourse. The p
mentioned are almost the only ones w
necessary to consider in our present de
the variety of the passions is great,
in every branch of that variety, of an
vestigation. The more accurately we
the human mind, the stronger traces we
find of his wisdom who made it. If a
the use of the parts of the body may b
as a hymn to the Creator, the use of
which are the organs of the mind, can

support in our search, we may be inquisitive without impertinence, and elevated without pride; we may be admitted, if I may dare say so, into the councils of the Almighty by a consideration of his works. The elevation of the mind ought to be the principal end of all our studies, which if they do not in some measure effect, they are of very little service to us. But, besides this great purpose, a consideration of the rationale of our passions seems to me very necessary for all who would affect them upon solid and sure principles. It is not enough to know them in general; to affect them after a delicate manner, or to judge properly of any works designed to affect them, we should know the exact boundaries of their several jurisdictions; we should peruse them through all their variety of operations, and pierce into the inmost, and what might appear inaccessible parts of our nature.

Quod latet arcana non enarrabile fibit.

Without all this it is possible for a man, after a confused manner, sometimes to satisfy his own mind of the truth of his work; but he can never have a certain determinate rule to go by, nor can he ever make his propositions sufficiently clear to others. Poets, and orators, and painters, and those who cultivate other branches of the liberal arts, have, without this critical knowledge, succeeded well in their several provinces, and will succeed; as among artificers there are many machines made, and even invented, without any exact knowledge of the principles they are governed by. It is, I own, not uncommon to be wrong in theory, and right in practice; and we are happy that it is so. Men then act right from their feelings, who afterward reason but ill on them from principle; but as it is possible to avoid an attempt at such reasoning.

little; and what they have done was more
view to their own schemes and systems :
those called critics, they have generally
rule of the arts in the wrong place; they
it among poems, pictures, engravings, statues
buildings. But art can never give the
make an art. This is, I believe, the
artists in general, and poets principally,
confined in so narrow a circle; they have
their imitators of one another, than of nature
this with so faithful a uniformity, and to
an antiquity, that it is hard to say who gave
model. Critics follow them, and therefore
little as guides. I can judge but poorly of
whilst I measure it by no other standard.
The true standard of the arts is in ex-
power; and an easy observation of the
mon, sometimes of the meanest things
in the truest lights, where the

These waters must be troubled before they can exert their virtues. A man who works beyond the surface of things, though he may be wrong himself, yet he clears the way for others, and may chance to make even his errors subservient to the cause of truth. In the following parts I shall inquire what things they are that cause in us the affections of the sublime and beautiful, as in this I have considered the affections themselves. I only desire one favour, that no part of this discourse be judged of by itself, and independently of the rest: for I am sensible I have not disposed my materials to abide the test of a captious controversy, but of a sober and even forgiving examination; that they are not armed at all points for battle, but dressed to visit those who are willing to give a peaceful entrance to truth.

PART II.

SECT. I.—OF THE PASSION CAUSED BY THE SUBLIME.

THE passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when those causes operate most powerfully, is astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror.* In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor, by consequence, reason on that object which employs it. Hence arises the great power of the sublime, that, far from being produced by them, it anticipates our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force. Astonishment, as I have said, is the effect of the sublime in its highest degree; the inferior effects are admiration, reverence, and respect.

* Part I. sect. 3, 4, 7.

whether this cause of terror be
less of dimensions or not; for it is impossible
to look on any thing as trifling or contemptible
which may be dangerous. There are many animals
though far from being large, are yet capable
of raising ideas of the sublime, because they are
considered as objects of terror; as serpents and
venomous animals of almost all kinds. And to
objects of great dimensions, if we annex an adven-
turous idea of terror, they become without compar-
ison greater. A level plain of a vast extent on land
certainly no mean idea; the prospect of such
a plain may be as extensive as a prospect of the
ocean: but can it ever fill the mind with any thing
so great as the ocean itself? This is owing to
several causes; but it is owing to none more than
this, that this ocean is an object of no small ter-
ror indeed terror is, in all cases whatsoever, ei-

— the ruling principle of

astonished mind; to express the effect either of simple fear or of astonishment: the word *attonitus* (thunderstruck) is equally expressive of the alliance of these ideas; and do not the French *étonnement*, and the English *astonishment* and *amazement*, point out as clearly the kindred emotions which attend fear and wonder? They who have a more general knowledge of languages could produce, I make no doubt, many other and equally striking examples.

SECT. III.—OBSCURITY.

To make any thing very terrible, obscurity* seems in general to be necessary. When we know the full extent of any danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes. Every one will be sensible of this, who considers how greatly night adds to our dread in all cases of danger, and how much the notions of ghosts and goblins, of which none can form clear ideas, affect minds which give credit to the popular tales concerning such sorts of beings. Those despotic governments which are founded on the passions of men, and principally upon the passion of fear, keep their chief as much as may be from the public eye. The policy has been the same in many cases of religion. Almost all the heathen temples were dark. Even in the barbarous temples of the Americans at this day they keep their idol in a dark part of the hut which is consecrated to his worship. For this purpose too the Druids performed all their ceremonies in the bosom of the darkest woods, and in the shade of the oldest and most spreading oaks. No person seems better to

* Part IV. sect. 14, 15, 16.

COLOURING, ITS USE AND ABUSE
of terrors :

. The other shape,
If shape it might be call'd, that shape had no;
Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb;
Or substance might be call'd, that shadow see:
For each seem'd either; black he stood as nig
Fieros as ten furies, terrible as hell,
And shook a deadly dart: what seem'd his he
The likeness of a kingly crown had on.

In this description all is dark, uncertain, c
terrible, and sublime to the last degree.

SECT. IV.—OF THE DIFFERENCE B
CLEARNESS AND OBSCURITY WITH
TO THE PASSIONS.

It is one thing to make an idea clear,
other to make it *affecting* to the imagin
I make a drawing of a palace, or a tem
landscape, I present a very clear idea
objects: but then (allowing for the effect

is by words: there is a great insufficiency [in all other methods of communication; and so far is a clearness of imagery from being absolutely necessary to an influence upon the passions, that they may be considerably operated upon, without presenting any image at all, by certain sounds adapted to that purpose; of which we have a sufficient proof in the acknowledged and powerful effects of instrumental music. In reality, a great clearness helps but little towards affecting the passions, as it is in some sort an enemy to all enthusiasms whatsoever.

SECT. V.—THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

THERE are two verses in Horace's Art of Poetry that seem to contradict this opinion, for which reason I shall take a little more pains in clearing it up. The verses are:

*Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures,
Quam quæ sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus.*

On this the Abbé du Bos founds a criticism, wherein he gives painting the preference to poetry, in the article of moving the passions; principally on account of the greater *clearness* of the ideas it represents. I believe this excellent judge was led into this mistake (if it be a mistake) by his system, to which he found it more conformable than I imagine it will be found by experience. I know several who admire and love painting, and yet who regard the objects of their admiration in that art with coolness enough, in comparison of that warmth with which they are animated by affecting pieces of poetry or rhetoric. Among the common sort of *people*, I never could perceive that painting had much influence on their passions. It is true that the

so that poetry, with all its obscurity, general, as well as a more powerful de the passions than the other art. And are reasons in nature why the obscure properly conveyed, should be more a the clear. It is our ignorance of thing all our admiration, and chiefly excites Knowledge and acquaintance make striking causes affect but little. It is vulgar; and all men are as the vulgar do not understand. The ideas of eternity are among the most affecting w perhaps there is nothing of which we so little as of infinity and eternity. Where meet a more sublime description justly celebrated one of Milton, where the portrait of Satan with a dignity the subject.

archangel, the sun rising through mists, or in an eclipse, the ruin of monarchs, and the revolutions of kingdoms. The mind is hurried out of itself by a crowd of great and confused images, which affect because they are crowded and confused : for, separate them, and you lose much of the greatness : and join them, and you infallibly lose the clearness. The images raised by poetry are always of this obscure kind ; though in general the effects of poetry are by no means to be attributed to the images it raises : which point we shall examine more at large hereafter.* But painting, when we have allowed for the pleasure of imitation, can only affect simply by the images it presents ; and even in painting, a judicious obscurity in some things contributes to the effect of the picture ; because the images in painting are exactly similar to those in nature : and in nature, dark, confused, uncertain images have a greater power on the fancy to form the grander passions, than those have which are more clear and determinate. But where and when this observation may be applied to practice, and how far it shall be extended, will be better deduced from the nature of the subject, and from the occasion, than from any rules that can be given.

I am sensible that this idea has met with opposition, and is likely still to be rejected by several. But let it be considered, that hardly any thing can strike the mind with its greatness which does not make some sort of approach towards infinity ; which nothing can do whilst we are able to perceive its bounds : but to see an object distinctly, and to perceive its bounds, is one and the same thing. A clear idea is therefore another name for a little *idea*. There is a passage in the book of Job amaz-

...; the image was before "
was silence ; and I heard a voice, Sha-
more just than God ! We are first pre-
utmost solemnity for the vision : v-
rified before we are let even into th-
of our emotion : but when the grand
makes its appearance, what is it ? is
in the shades of its own incompreher-
more awful, more striking, more te-
liveliest description, than the clea-
could possibly represent it ! When
attempted to give us clear representa-
very fanciful and terrible ideas, they
almost always failed ; insomuch that
a loss, in all the pictures I have seen o-
the painter did not intend something
veral painters have handled a subject
with a view of assembling as many ho-
as their imaginations could suggest ;

SECT. VI.—POWER.

BESIDES these things which *directly* suggest the idea of danger, and those which produce a similar effect from a mechanical cause, I know of nothing sublime which is not some modification of power. And this branch rises, as naturally as the other two branches, from terror, the common stock of every thing that is sublime. The idea of power, at first view, seems of the class of these indifferent ones which may equally belong to pain or to pleasure. But, in reality, the affection arising from the idea of vast power is extremely remote from that neutral character. For first, we must remember,* that the idea of pain, in its highest degree, is much stronger than the highest degree of pleasure; and that it preserves the same superiority through all the subordinate gradations. From hence it is that, where the chances for equal degrees of suffering or enjoyment are in any sort equal, the idea of the suffering must always be prevalent. And indeed the ideas of pain, and, above all, of death, are so very affecting, that whilst we remain in the presence of whatever is supposed to have the power of inflicting either, it is impossible to be perfectly free from terror. Again, we know by experience that, for the enjoyment of pleasure, no great efforts of power are at all necessary; nay, we know that such efforts would go a great way towards destroying our satisfaction; for pleasure must be stolen, and not forced upon us; pleasure follows the will; and therefore we are generally affected with it by many things of a force greatly inferior to our own. But pain is always inflicted by a power in some way superior.

* Part I, sect 7.

Let the emotion you feel is, rest
strength should be employed to the
rapine and destruction. That power
sublimity from the terror with which
accompanied will appear evidently
in the very few cases in which it is
to strip a considerable degree of stren-
gth to hurt. When you do this, y
every thing sublime, and it immedi-
ately contemptible. An ox is a creature of
but he is an innocent creature, extra-
ordinary, and not at all dangerous; for
the idea of an ox is by no means great
strong too; but his strength is of a
often very destructive, seldom (at least)
of any use in our business: the idea
therefore great, and it has frequent
sublime descriptions and elevating
Let us look at another strong animal

entirely disappears, and the terrible and sublime blend out together. We have continually about us animals of a strength that is considerable, but not pernicious. Amongst these we never look for the sublime; it comes upon us in the gloomy forest, and in the howling wilderness, in the form of the lion, the tiger, the panther, or rhinoceros. Whenever strength is only useful, and employed for our benefit or our pleasure, then it is never sublime; for nothing can act agreeably to us, that does not act in conformity to our will; but, to act agreeably to our will, it must be subject to us, and therefore can never be the cause of a grand and commanding conception. The description of the wild ass, in Job, is worked up into no small sublimity, merely by insisting on his freedom, and his setting mankind at defiance; otherwise the description of such an animal could have had nothing noble in it. 'Who hath loosed,' says he, 'the bands of the wild ass? whose house I have made the wilderness, and the barren land his dwellings. He scorneth the multitude of the city, neither regardeth he the voice of the driver. The range of the mountains is his pasture.' The magnificent description of the unicorn, and of the leviathan, in the same book, is full of the same heightening circumstances: 'Will the unicorn be willing to serve thee? canst thou bind the unicorn with his band in the furrow? wilt thou trust him because his strength is great?—Canst thou draw out leviathan with a hook? will he make a covenant with thee? wilt thou take him for a servant for ever? shall not one be cast down even at the sight of him?' In short, wheresoever we find strength, and in what light soever we look upon power, we shall all along observe the sublime the concomitant of terror, and contempt the attendant.

whole brute creation, but more approp-
riate nearer to contempt than is commonly
and accordingly, though we caress dogs,
from them an appellation of the most
kind, when we employ terms of reproach.
appellation is the common mark of the
and contempt in every language. Wolves
more strength than several species of
on account of their unmanageable fier-
idea of a wolf is not despicable; it is not
from grand descriptions and similitudes
are affected by strength, which is not
The power which arises from instituti-
and commanders has the same con-
terror. Sovereigns are frequently add-
the title of *dread Majesty*. And it may be
that young persons little acquainted with
and who have not been used to approach
power, are commonly struck with an

and have hazarded to affirm that we can contemplate the idea of God himself without any such emotion. I purposely avoided, when I first considered this subject, to introduce the idea of that great and tremendous Being, as an example in an argument so light as this; though it frequently occurred to me, not as an objection to, but as a strong confirmation of my notions in this matter. I hope in what I am going to say I shall avoid presumption, where it is almost impossible for any mortal to speak with strict propriety. I say, then, that whilst we consider the Godhead merely as he is an object of the understanding, which forms a complex idea of power, wisdom, justice, goodness, all stretched to a degree far exceeding the bounds of our comprehension; whilst we consider the divinity in this refined and abstracted light, the imagination and passions are little or nothing affected. But because we are bound, by the condition of our nature, to ascend to these pure and intellectual ideas through the medium of sensible images, and to judge of these divine qualities by their evident acts and exertions, it becomes extremely hard to disentangle our idea of the cause from the effect by which we are led to know it. Thus when we contemplate the Deity, his attributes and their operation, coming united on the mind, form a sort of sensible image, and, as such, are capable of affecting the imagination. Now, though, in a just idea of the Deity, perhaps none of his attributes are predominant, yet, to our imagination, his power is by far the most striking. Some reflection, some comparing, is necessary to satisfy us of his wisdom, his justice, and his goodness. To be struck with *his power*, it is only necessary that we should open our eyes. But whilst we contemplate so vast an

from a force which nothing can withstand; we rejoice, we rejoice with trembling; and even when we are receiving benefits, we cannot but be in awe of a power which can confer benefits of such importance. When the prophet David contemplates the wonders of wisdom and power which are played in the economy of man, he seems to do so with a sort of divine horror, and cries out, 'How fully and wonderfully am I made!' A philosopher has a sentiment of a similar nature when he looks upon it as the last effort of philosophy, to behold, without terror and amazement, this immense and glorious fabric of the universe.

Hunc solem, et stellas, et decedentia certis
Tempora momentis, sunt qui formidine nulla
Imbuti spectant.

Lucretius is a poet not to be suspected of any way to superstitious terrors: yet when he describes the whole mechanism of nature laid open

king; every thing terrible in nature is called up to
 lighten the awe and solemnity of the divine
 presence. The psalms, and the prophetic books,
 crowded with instances of this kind. 'The
 earth shook,' says the Psalmist, 'the heavens also
 trembled at the presence of the Lord.' And, what
 remarkable, the pointing preserves the same
 character, not only when he is supposed descend-
 ing to take vengeance upon the wicked, but even
 when he exerts the like plenitude of power in acts of
 beneficence to mankind. 'Tremble; thou earth!
 at the presence of the Lord; at the presence of
 God of Jacob; which turned the rock into
 living water, the flint into a fountain of waters!'
 were endless to enumerate all the passages
 in the sacred and profane writers, which
 establish the general sentiment of mankind con-
 cerning the inseparable union of a sacred and
 parental awe, with our ideas of the Divinity.
 See the common maxim, *Præter in orbe deos fecit*
terrore. This maxim may be, as I believe it is, false
 as to the origin of religion. The maker
 of the maxim saw how inseparable these ideas were,
 without considering that the notion of some great
 power must be always precedent to our dread of it.
 This dread must necessarily follow the idea of
 a power when it is once excited in the mind.
 Upon this principle that true religion has, and
 it has, so large a mixture of salutary fear; and
 that false religions have generally nothing else but
 to support them. Before the Christian reli-
 gion had, as it were, humanized the idea of the
 divinity, and brought it somewhat nearer to us,
 there was very little said of the love of God. The
 powers of Plato have something of it, and only
 nothing; the other writers of Pagan antiquity.

... which proceeds from that source...
 and power through its several gradations un-
 highest of all, where our imagination is final
 ; and we find terror, quite throughout the pr-
 is, its inseparable companion, and growing aloi-
 n it as far as we can possibly trace them. No
 power is undoubtedly a capital source of the su-
 e, this will point out evidently from whence
 rgy is derived, and to what class of ideas
 ght to unite it.

SECT. VII.—PRIVATION.

ALL *general* privations are great, because they
 ll terrible ; *Vacuity, Darkness, Solitude*, and
isce. With what a fire of imagination, yet
 what severity of judgment has Virgil amasse
 these circumstances, where he knows that al-
 mages of a tremendous dignity ought to be ur-
 ... where, before he unloes

Give me, ye great transcendent powers, to tell
 Of scenes and wonders in the depth of hell:
 Show me your mighty scepter to display
 O'er these black realms of darkness to the day.—*Pist.*
 Secure they went through dreary shades that led
 Along the waste boundaries of the soul.—*Dryden.*

SECT. VIII.—VASTNESS.

VASTNESS of dimension is a powerful cause of sublime. This is too evident, and the observation common to need any illustration; it is not necessary to consider in what ways greatness of space, vastness of extent, or quantity, has the striking effect; for certainly there are ways and modes wherein the same quantity of extension will produce greater effects than it is found to do there. Extension is either in length, height, or breadth. Of these the length strikes least; a hundred yards of even ground will never work such an effect as a tower a hundred yards high, or a rock or mountain of that altitude. I am apt to imagine, vice, that height is less grand than depth; and we are more struck at looking down from a precipice, than looking up at an object of equal height: of that I am not very positive. A perpendicular has more force in forming the sublime than an inclined plane; and the effects of a rugged and uneven surface seem stronger than where it is smooth and polished. It would carry us out of the way to enter in this place into the cause of these appearances; but certain it is they afford a large and fruitful field of speculation. However, it may not be amiss to add to these remarks upon altitude, that as the great extreme of dimension is sublime, so the last extreme of littleness is in a measure sublime likewise; when we attend to the infinite divisibility of matter, when we perceive

confronted at the wonders of infinity
we distinguish in its effect this extreme
from the vast itself; for division means
as well as addition; because the id
unity can no more be arrived at than
plete whole, to which nothing may be

SECT. IX.—INFINITY

· ANOTHER source of this sublime is
does not rather belong to the last.
tendency to fill the mind with that
ful horror which is the most genuine
truest test of the sublime. There are
things which can become the objects
that are really and in their own nature
but the eye not being able to perceive
of many things, they seem to be in
produce the same effects as if they
We are deceived in the like manner

hammer, the hammer-beat and the water roars in the imagination long after the first sounds have ceased to affect it; and they die away at last by gradations which are scarcely perceptible. If you hold up a straight pole, with your eye to one end, it will seem extended to a length almost incredible.* Place a number of uniform and equidistant marks on this pole, they will cause the same deception, and seem multiplied without end. The senses, strongly affected in some one manner, cannot quickly change their tenor or adapt themselves to other things; but they continue in their old channel until the strength of the first mover decays. This is the reason of an appearance very frequent in madmen, that they remain whole days and nights, sometimes whole years, in the constant repetition of some remark, some complaint, or song; which having struck powerfully on their disordered imagination in the beginning of their frenzy, every repetition reinforces it with new strength; and the hurry of their spirits, unrestrained by the curb of reason, continues it to the end of their lives.

SECT. X.—SUCCESSION AND UNIFORMITY.

SUCCESSION and *uniformity* of parts are what constitute the artificial infinite. 1. *Succession*; which is requisite that the parts may be continued so long and in such a direction as, by their frequent impulses on the sense, to impress the imagination with an idea of their progress beyond their actual limits. 2. *Uniformity*; because, if the figures of the parts should be changed, the imagination at every change finds a check; you are presented at every alteration with the termination of one idea and the beginning of another; by which means it becomes impossible

* Part IV. sect. 14.

imagination has no rest. But the uniform as well as circularly disposed figure its full force; because any other it be in the disposition or in the in the colour of the parts, is highly the idea of infinity, which every chain and interrupt at every alteration comes series. On the same principles of uniformity, the grand appearance of heathen temples, which were geometric forms, with a range of uniform pillars will be easily accounted for. From this also may be derived the grand effect of many of our own old cathedrals. The cross used in some churches seems eligible as the parallelogram of the least, I imagine it is not so proper for, supposing the arms of the cross

thereby wholly turn the imagination from the repetition of the former idea. Or suppose the spectator placed, where he may take a direct view of such a building, what will be the consequence? the necessary consequence will be, that a good part of the basis of such angle, formed by the intersection of the arms of the cross, must be inevitably lost; the whole must of course assume a broken unconnected figure; the lights must be unequal, here strong, and there weak; without that noble gradation which the perspective always effects on parts disposed uninterruptedly in a right line. Some or all of these objections will lie against every figure of a cross, in whatever view you take it. I exemplified them in the Greek cross, in which these faults appear the most strongly; but they appear in some degree in all sorts of crosses. Indeed, there is nothing more prejudicial to the grandeur of buildings, than to abound in angles—a fault obvious in many, and owing to an inordinate thirst for variety, which, whenever it prevails, is sure to leave very little true taste.

SECT. XI.—MAGNITUDE IN BUILDING.

To the sublime in building, greatness in dimension seems requisite; for, on a few parts, and those small, the imagination cannot rise to any idea of infinity. No greatness in the manner can effectually compensate for the want of proper dimensions. There is no danger of drawing men into extravagant designs by this rule; it carries its own caution along with it; because too great a length in buildings destroys the purpose of greatness which it was intended to promote; the perspective will lessen it in height as it gains in length, and will bring it at last to a point, turning the whole figure into a sort

are vast only by their dimensions are
sign of a common and low imagination
of art can be great, but as it deceives ;
wise, is the prerogative of nature on
eye will fix the medium betwixt an exc
or height (for the same objection lies a
and a short or broken quantity : and
might be ascertained to a tolerable d
actness, if it was my purpose to descen
particulars of any art.

SECT. XII.—INFINITY IN PLEASIN

INFINITY, though of another kind,
of our pleasure in agreeable, as well
light in sublime images. The spring
santest of the seasons ; and the young
mals, though far from being complete
afford a more agreeable sensation t

SECT. XIII.—DIFFICULTY.

THE source of greatness is *Difficulty*.^{*} When work seems to have required immense force labour to effect it, the idea is grand. Stones, neither for disposition nor ornament, has nothing admirable; but those huge rude masses are, set on end, and piled on each other, turned about on the immense force necessary for such work; nay, the rudeness of the work increases the sense of grandeur, as it excludes the idea of art contrivance; for dexterity produces another effect, which is different enough from this.

SECT. XIV.—MAGNIFICENCE.

MAGNIFICENCE is likewise a source of the sublime. A great profusion of things, which are splendid or noble in themselves, is *magnificent*. The starry heaven, though it occurs so very frequently to our view, never fails to excite an idea of grandeur. This must be owing to any thing in the stars themselves, separately considered. The number is certainly the cause. The apparent disorder augments grandeur, for the appearance of care is highly contrary to our ideas of magnificence. Besides, the confusion in such apparent confusion, as makes it impossible, on ordinary occasions, to reckon them, gives them the advantage of a sort of infinity. In works of art, this kind of grandeur, which consists in multitude, is to be very cautiously admitted; a profusion of excellent things is not to be abused, or with too much difficulty; and because, in many cases, this splendid confusion would detract from all use, which should be attended to in most works of art with the greatest care; besides,

^{*} Part IV. sect. 4, 5, 6.

mind is so dazzled as to make it impossible to that exact coherence and agreeable allusions, which we should require on every occasion. I do not now remember a better example of this, than the description of the king's army in the play of Henry

All furnish'd, all in arms,
All plum'd like estridges, that wing the sun;
Bated like eagles having lately bath'd:
As full of spirit as the month of May,
And gorgeous as the sun at midsumme
Wanton as youthful goats, wild as young horses;
I saw young Harry,—with his beaver on his brow
Rise from the ground like feather'd Mars;
And vaulted with such ease into his seat,
As if an angel dropp'd down from the clouds
To turn and wind a fiery Pegasus.

In that excellent book, so remarkable for the simplicity and vacuity of its description, as well as for the depth and penetration of its sentences, the Wise Man says, "The world is a stage, and all the men and women are but players."

s, and as the frankincense tree in summer; and incense in the censer, and as a vessel of set with precious stones; as a fair olive tree bringing forth fruit, and as a cypress which groweth the clouds. When he put on the robe of honour and was clothed with the perfection of glory, he went up to the holy altar, he made the seat of holiness honourable. He himself stood at the hearth of the altar, compassed with his men round about; as a young cedar in Libanus, and palm-trees compassed they him about. So all the sons of Aaron in their glory, and the sons of the Lord in their hands, &c.

SECT. XV.—LIGHT.

WE considered extension, so far as it is capable of raising ideas of greatness, *colour* comes under consideration. All colours depend on

Light, therefore, ought previously to be examined; and with its opposite, darkness. With respect to light, to make it a cause capable of producing the sublime, it must be attended with some circumstances besides its bare faculty of shewing objects. Mere light is too common a thing to make a strong impression on the mind; and without a strong impression nothing can be sublime. Such a light as that of the sun, immediately upon the eye, as it overpowers the sense, is a great idea. Light of an inferior strength to that which moves with great celerity, has the same effect; for lightning is certainly productive of terror, which it owes chiefly to the extreme velocity of its motion. A quick transition from light to darkness, and from darkness to light, has yet a more powerful effect. But darkness is more productive of sublime ideas than light. Our great poet was con-

incomprehensible of all beings, but

...With the majesty of *darkness* !
Circles his throne.

And, what is no less remarkable, the secret of preserving this idea, seemed to depart the farthest from it, and describes the light and glory which flow from his presence : a light which, by its excess, is converted into a species of darkness

Dark with excessive light thy skirt

Here is an idea not only poetical in itself, but strictly and philosophically justified. The light, by overcoming the organs of sight, produces a species of darkness in all objects, so as in its effect exactly the reverse of light. After looking for some time at two black spots, the impression seems to dance before our eyes. These two ideas, as opposite as can be imagined,

this remark is applicable to building. I think, then, that all edifices, calculated to produce an idea of the sublime, ought rather to be dark and gloomy; and this for two reasons; the first is that darkness itself, on other occasions, is known by experience to have a greater effect on the passions than light. The second is, that to make an object very striking, we should make it as different as possible from the objects with which we have been immediately conversant; when, therefore, you enter a building, you cannot pass into a greater light than you had in the open air: to go into one some few degrees less luminous, can make only a trifling change: but, to make the transition thoroughly striking, you ought to pass from the greatest light to as much darkness as is consistent with the uses of architecture. At night the contrary rule will hold, but for the very same reason; and the more highly a room is then illuminated, the grander will the passion be.

SECT. XVII.—COLOUR CONSIDERED AS
PRODUCTIVE OF THE SUBLIME.

AMONG colours, such as are soft or cheerful (except, perhaps, a strong red, which is cheerful), are unfit to produce grand images. An immense mountain, covered with a shining green turf, is nothing in this respect to one dark and gloomy; the cloudy sky is more grand than the blue, and night more sublime and solemn than day. Therefore, in historical painting, a gay or gaudy drapery can never have a happy effect: and in buildings, when the highest degree of the sublime is intended, the materials and ornaments ought neither to be white, nor green, nor yellow, nor blue, nor of a pale red, nor violet, nor spotted, but of sad and fuscous colours.

studied in all sorts of edifices which must be studied; in such cases they be drawn from the other sources, variation, however, against any thing like nothing so effectually deadens the the sublime.

SECT. XVIII.—SOUND AND I

THE eye is not the only organ of sense; a sublime passion may be produced a great power in these as in most of do not mean words, because words simply by their sounds, but by means different. Excessive loudness alone overpower the soul, to suspend it fill it with terror. The noise of raging storms, thunder, or artillery, and awful sensation in the mind.

SECT. XIX.—SUDDENNESS.

A SUDDEN beginning, or sudden cessation of sound of any considerable force, has the same power. The attention is roused by this; and the faculties driven forward, as it were, on their guard. Whatever, either in sights or sounds, makes the transition from one extreme to the other easy, causes no terror, and consequently can be no cause of greatness. In every thing sudden and unexpected, we are apt to start; that is, we have a perception of danger, and our nature rouses us to guard against it. It may be observed, that a single sound of some strength, though but of short duration, if repeated after intervals, has a grand effect. Few things are more awful than the striking of a great clock, when the silence of the night prevents the attention from being too much dissipated. The same may be said of a single stroke of a drum repeated with pauses, and of the successive firing of cannon at a distance. All the effects mentioned in this section have causes very nearly alike.

SECT. XX.—INTERMITTING.

A LOW, tremulous, intermitting sound, though it seems in some respects opposite to that just mentioned, is productive of the sublime. It is worth while to examine this a little. The fact itself must be determined by every man's own experience and reflection. I have already observed,* that night increases our terror more perhaps than any thing else; it is our nature, when we do not know what may happen to us, to fear the worst that can happen; and hence it is, that uncertainty is so terrible, that we often seek to be rid of it, at the hazard of a

* Sect. 2.

Or as the moon clothed with cloudy night,
Doth shew to him who walks in fear and grief

But a light now appearing, and now lea-
so off and on, is even more terrible than
ness : and a sort of uncertain sounds and
necessary dispositions concur, more than
a total silence.

SECT. XXI.—THE CRIES OF ANIMALS

SUCH sounds as imitate the natural
voices of men, or any animals in pain
are capable of conveying great ideas, and
the well known voice of some creature
are used to look with contempt. The
of wild beasts are equally capable of causing
and awful sensation.

Hinc exaudiri gemitus, iraque leonum
Vincula recusantium, et sera sub nocte rudes
Saturarint aures atrox in vocemque sonum

sublime, are almost infinite. Those I have mentioned are only a few instances to shew on what principle they are all built.

SECT. XXII.—SMELL AND TASTE, BITTERS
AND STENCHES.

SMELLS and Tastes have some share too in ideas of greatness: but it is a small one, weak in its nature, and confined in its operations. I shall only observe, that no smells or tastes can produce a grand sensation, except excessive bitters and intolerable stench. It is true that these affections of the smell and taste, when they are in their full force, and lean directly upon the sensory, are simply painful, and accompanied with no sort of delight; but when they are moderated, as in a description or narrative, they become sources of the sublime, as genuine as any other, and upon the very same principle of a moderated pain. "A cup of bitterness;"—"to drain the bitter cup of fortune;"—"the bitter apples of Sodom;" these are all ideas suitable to a sublime description. Nor is this passage of Virgil without sublimity, where the stench of the vapour in Albunea conspires so happily with the sacred horror and gloominess of that prophetic forest:

Et rex sollicitus monetrice oracula Fanni
Fatidici geutoris adit, lucosque sub alta
Consult Albunea, nemorum quæ maxima sacre
Fonte sonat; *savamque exhalat opaca Mephitim.*

In the sixth book, and in a very sublime description, the poisonous exhalation of Acheron is not forgot; nor does it at all disagree with the other images amongst which it is introduced:

Spelunca alta fuit, vastoque immanis hiatus
Scrupes, tuta læca nigra, nemorumque tenebris,
Quam super hæc nullo poterant impune volantes
Tendere iter penne, talis sese halitus atris
Faucibus effundens superna ad convexa ferebat.

given subject, such a subject as
 all other instances as well as in the
 one of the tests by which the sublimity
 to be tried, not whether it becomes m
 sociated with mean ideas; but whether
 with images of an allowed grander
 composition is supported with dign
 which are terrible are always grea
 things possess disagreeable qualitie
 have indeed some degree of danger, b
 easily overcome, they are merely od
 and spiders.

SECT. XXIII.—FEELING AND

OF Feeling, little more can be said
 idea of bodily pain, in all the modes a
 labour, pain, anguish, torment, is pro
 sublime; and nothing else, in this se
 duce it. I need not give here any fre

we have; that its strongest emotion is an emotion of distress; and that no pleasure* from a positive cause belongs to it. Numberless examples, besides those mentioned, might be brought in support of these truths, and many, perhaps useful consequences drawn from them—

*Sed fugit interea, fugit irrevocabile tempus,
Singula dum capti circumvectimur amore.*

PART III.

SECT. I.—OF BEAUTY.

IT is my design to consider beauty as distinguished from the sublime; and in the course of the inquiry, to examine how far it is consistent with it. But previous to this, we must take a short review of the opinions already entertained of this quality; which I think are hardly to be reduced to any fixed principles; because men are used to talk of beauty in a figurative manner, that is to say, in a manner extremely uncertain and undeterminate. By beauty, I mean that quality, or those qualities in bodies, by which they cause love, or some passion similar to it. I confine this definition to the merely sensible qualities of things for the sake of preserving the utmost simplicity in a subject which must always distract us, whenever we take in those various causes of sympathy which attach us to any persons or things from secondary considerations, and not from the direct force which they have merely on being viewed. I likewise distinguish love, by which I mean that satisfaction which arises to the mind upon contemplating any thing beautiful, of whatever nature it may be, from desire or lust, which is

* Vide Part I. sect. 6.

beauty, and the passion
 call love, is different from desire, though
 sometimes may operate along with it; but
 this latter that we must attribute those viole
 tempestuous passions, and the consequent en
 of the body which attend what is called love i
 of its ordinary acceptations, and not to the
 of beauty merely as it is such.

SECT. II.—PROPORTION NOT THE CAUSE
 BEAUTY IN VEGETABLES.

BEAUTY hath usually been said to consist in
 proportions of parts. On considering the
 I have great reason to doubt whether bear
 all an idea belonging to proportion. Propo
 lates almost wholly to convenience, as ever
 order seems to do; and it must therefore
 sidered as a creature of the understandin
 * - primary cause acting on the se

not very clearly the force of the term, nor to have any distinct ideas concerning the thing itself. Proportion is the measure of relative quantity. Since quantity is divisible, it is evident that every distinct part, into which any quantity is divided, must bear some relation to the other parts, or to the whole. These relations give an origin to the idea of proportion. They are discovered by mensuration; and they are the objects of mathematical inquiry. But whether any part of any determinate quantity be a fourth, or a fifth, or a sixth, or moiety the whole; or whether it be of equal length with any other part, or double its length, or but one half, is a matter merely indifferent to the mind; it stands out in the question: and it is from this absolute difference and tranquillity of the mind, that mathematical speculations derive some of their most considerable advantages; because there is nothing to interest the imagination; because the judgment is free and unbiassed to examine the point. All proportions, every arrangement of quantity is alike to the understanding, because the same truths result from it from all; from greater, from lesser, from equality, and inequality.—But surely beauty is not a matter belonging to mensuration; nor has it anything to do with calculation and geometry. If it did, we might then point out some certain measures which we could demonstrate to be beautiful, whether as simply considered, or as related to others; and we could call in those natural objects, for whose beauty we have no voucher but the sense, to this proper standard, and confirm the voice of our passions by the determination of our reason. But, since we have not this help, let us see whether proportion can in any sense be considered as the cause of beauty, as hath been so generally, and by some confidently affirmed. If proportion be one of

inquire whether

are found beautiful in the vegetable or animal kingdoms, are constantly so formed according to certain measures, as may serve to satisfy us that their beauty results from those measures on the principle of a natural mechanical cause; or from custom; or in fine, from their fitness for any particular purposes. I intend to examine this subject under each of these heads in their order. But, before I proceed farther, I hope it will not be thought amiss if I lay down the rules which govern me in this inquiry, and which have misled me if I have gone astray. 1. If two bodies produce the same or a similar effect on the mind, and on examination they are found to agree in some of their properties, and to differ in others, the common effect is to be attributed to the properties in which they agree, and not to those in which they differ. Not to account for the effect of a natural object by an artificial object. 3. Not to

power as it appears in vegetables, in animals, and in man. Turning our eyes to the vegetable creation, we find nothing there but flowers; but flowers are almost of every shape, and of every sort of disposition, turned and fashioned into an infinite variety, and from these forms botanists have given their names, which are almost as various. In what proportion do we discover between the stalk and the leaves of flowers, or between the leaves and the stalks? How does the slender stalk of the tulip support the bulky head under which it bends? How does a beautiful flower; and can we not say that it does not owe a great deal to that disproportion? The rose is a flower, yet it grows upon a small shrub; the apple of the apple is very small, and grows upon a large tree; yet the rose and the apple blossom are both beautiful, and the plants which bear them are both beautiful.

only measure.
soul of proportion, are found rather pre-
in serviceable to the cause of beauty.

SECT. III.—PROPORTION NOT THE CAUSE OF
BEAUTY IN ANIMALS.

THAT proportion has but a small share in the
causation of beauty is full as evident among animals
where the greatest variety of shapes, and dispro-
portions of parts, are well fitted to excite this
idea. The swan, confessedly a beautiful bird, has a
longer than the rest of his body, and but a
short tail: is this a beautiful proportion? we
allow that it is. But, then, what shall we say
of the peacock, who has comparatively but a
neck, with a tail longer than the neck and the
rest of the body taken together? How many birds
there that vary infinitely from each of these
examples, and from every other which you can fix
as a standard, and often directly oppo-

advised in their extension or gradation, there is a law of proportion to be observed. Some are of one single colour, others have all the colours of a rainbow; some are of the primary colours, some of the mixed; in short, an attentive observer may soon conclude that there is as little of variation in the colouring as in the shapes of these objects. Turn next to beasts: examine the head of a beautiful horse; find what proportion that bears to his body, and to his limbs, and what relations he has to each other; and, when you have observed these proportions as a standard of beauty, take a dog or cat, or any other animal, and examine how far the same proportions between their heads and their neck, between those and the body, so on, are found to hold; I think we may safely say that they differ in every species! yet that there are individuals found in a great many species so perfect that have a very striking beauty. Now, if we allow that very different, and even contrary habits and dispositions are consistent with beauty, amounts, I believe, to a concession, that no certain measure, operating from a natural principle, is necessary to produce it, at least so far as the different species are concerned.

IV.—PROPORTION NOT THE CAUSE OF BEAUTY IN THE HUMAN SPECIES.

THERE are some parts of the human body that are supposed to hold certain proportions to each other; before it can be proved that the efficient cause of beauty lies in these, it must be shewn that, wherever these are found exact, the person to whom they belong is beautiful: I mean in the effect produced on the view, either of any member distinctly considered, or of the whole body together. It must

which were not only very
other, but where one has been very beauti-
ful and the other very remote from beauty. With
regard to the parts which are found so proportioned,
they are often so remote from each other in sit-
uation, nature, and office, that I cannot see how
admission of any comparison, nor consequently how
effect owing to proportion can result from it.
The neck, say they, in beautiful bodies, al-
most measures with the calf of the leg; it should like
to be twice the circumference of the wrist. An
infinity of observations of this kind are to be met
in the writings and conversations of many.
What relation has the calf of the leg to the neck
either of these parts to the wrist? These propo-
sitions are certainly to be found in handsome
bodies as certainly in ugly ones; as any, who
take the pains, to try, may find. Nay, I
think but they may be the least perfect in the
series and

conspicuous and of great consideration; and that they differ no less from the proportions we find in living men, of forms extremely striking and agreeable. And, after all, how are the partisans of proportional beauty agreed amongst themselves about the proportions of the human body? Some hold it to be seven heads; some make it eight; whilst others extend it even to ten; a vast difference in such a small number of divisions! Others take other methods of estimating the proportions, and all with equal success. But are these proportions exactly the same in all handsome men? or are they at all the proportions found in beautiful women? Nobody will say that they are; yet both sexes are undoubtedly capable of beauty, and the female of the greatest; which advantage, I believe, will hardly be attributed to the superior exactness of proportion in the fair sex. Let us rest a moment on this point, and consider how much difference there is between the measures that prevail in many similar parts of the body in the two sexes of this single species only. If you assign any determinate proportions to the limbs of a man, and if you limit human beauty to these proportions; when you find a woman who differs in the make and measure of almost every part, you must conclude her not to be beautiful, in spite of the suggestions of your imagination; or, in obedience to your imagination, you must renounce your rules; you must lay by the scale and compass, and look out for some other cause of beauty. For, if beauty be attached to certain measures which operate from a *principle in nature*, why should similar parts, with different measures of proportion, be found to have beauty, and this too in the very same species? But, to open *our view* a little, it is worth observing, that almost

their disposition, measures, and re
we have before observed, amidst th
sity, one particular is common to
several of the individuals which co
capable of affecting us with a sense o
whilst they agree in producing this e
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which have produced it. These con
sufficient to induce me to reject th
particular proportions that operate
produce a pleasing effect; but those
with me, with regard to a particu
are strongly prepossessed in favor
indefinite. They imagine, that al
in general is annexed to no certain
mon to the several kinds of pleasing
mals, yet that there is a certain pro
species absolutely essential to the bea

considerable variation amongst the individuals; and as it has been shewn of the human, so it may be shewn of the brute kinds, that beauty is found indifferently in all the proportions which each kind can admit, without quitting its common form; and it is this idea of common form that makes the proportion of parts at all regarded, and not the operation of any natural cause; indeed a little consideration will make it appear that it is not measure but manner that creates all the beauty which belongs to shape. What light do we borrow from these boasted proportions when we study ornamental design? It seems amazing to me that artists, if they were as well convinced as they pretend to be, that proportion is a principal cause of beauty, have not by them at all times accurate measurements of all sorts of beautiful animals to help them to proper proportions when they would contrive any thing elegant, especially as they frequently assert that it is from an observation of the beautiful in nature they direct their practice. I know that it has been said long since, and echoed backward and forward from one writer to another a thousand times, that the proportions of building have been taken from those of the human body. To make this forced analogy complete, they represent a man with his arms raised and extended at full length, and then describe a sort of square, as it is formed by passing lines along the extremities of this strange figure. But it appears very clearly to me, that the human figure never supplied the architect with any of his ideas: for, in the first place, men are very rarely seen in this strained posture; it is not natural to them, neither is it at all becoming. Secondly, the view of the human figure so disposed does not naturally suggest the idea of a square, but rather of a

sical, than for an architect to informance by the human figure, since can have less resemblance or analogy and a house or temple : do we not that their purposes are entirely different am apt to suspect is this, that these are devised to give a credit to the works containing a conformity between them and works in nature : not that the latter supply hints for the perfection of the I am the more fully convinced that proportion have transferred their art nature, and not borrowed from the notions they use in works of art ; because on this subject, they always as possible, the open field of natural animal and vegetable kingdom, and selves with the artificial lines and architecture : for there is in mankind a

and fashioned the walks into squares, triangles, and other mathematical figures, with exactness and symmetry; and they thought, if they were not imitating, they were at least improving nature, and teaching her to know her business. But nature has at last escaped from their discipline and their fetters; and our gardens, if nothing else, declare we begin to feel that mathematical ideas are not the true measures of beauty. And surely they are full as little so in the animal as the vegetable world; for is it not extraordinary, that, in these fine descriptive pieces, these innumerable odes and elegies, which are in the mouths of all the world, and many of which have been the entertainment of ages—that in these pieces which describe love with such a passionate energy, and represent its object in such an infinite variety of lights, not one word is said of proportion, if it be, what some insist it is, the principal component of beauty; whilst, at the same time several other qualities are very frequently and warmly mentioned? But if proportion has not this power, it may appear odd how men came originally to be so prepossessed in its favour. It arose, I imagine, from the fondness I have just mentioned, which men bear so remarkably to their own works and notions: it arose from false reasoning on the effects of the customary figure of animals; it arose from the Platonic theory of fitness and aptitude; for which reason, in the next section, I shall consider the effects of the custom in the figure of animals; and, afterward, the idea of fitness; since, if proportion does not operate by a natural power attending some measures, it must be either by custom, or the idea of utility; there is no other way.

causes of deformity were removed, naturally and necessarily be introduced, is a mistake; for *deformity* is to beauty, but to the *complete, common* of the legs of a man be found shorter, the man is deformed; because something wanting to complete the whole of a man; and this has the same effect as faults, as maiming and mutilation produce accidents. So, if the back be humped, deformed; because his back has an undue height, and what carries with it the idea of sickness or misfortune; so if a man's neck be longer or shorter than usual, we say he is deformed in that part, because men are not compared in that manner. But surely every experience may convince us, that a man with legs of an equal length, and resembling in all respects, and his neck of a just

were represented, we should by no means wait until custom had settled an idea of proportion before we decided concerning its beauty or ugliness : which shows that the general idea of beauty can be no more owing to customary than to natural proportion. Deformity arises from the want of the common proportions ; but the necessary result of their existence in any object is not beauty. If we suppose proportion in natural things to be relative to custom and use, the nature of use and custom will shew that beauty, which is a *positive* and powerful quality, cannot result from it. We are so wonderfully formed, that, whilst we are creatures vehemently desirous of novelty, we are as strongly attached to habit and custom. But it is the nature of things which hold us by custom, to affect us very little whilst we are in possession of them, but strongly when they are absent. I remember to have frequented a certain place every day for a long time together ; and I may truly say, that, so far from finding pleasure in it, I was affected with a sort of weariness and disgust ; I came, I went, I returned, without pleasure ; yet if by any means I passed by the usual time of my going thither, I was remarkably uneasy, and was not quiet till I had got into my old track. They who use snuff take it almost without being sensible that they take it, and the acute sense of smell is deadened, so as to feel hardly any thing from so sharp a stimulus ; yet deprive the snuff-taker of his box, and he is the most uneasy mortal in the world. Indeed, so far are use and habit from being causes of pleasure, merely as such, that the effect of constant use is to make all things, of whatever kind, entirely uninteresting : for, as use at last takes off the painful effect of many things, it re-

... of appearance ...
... us in it ; when this chance occurs ...
... pleasure from some mechanical cause, we are
... hurt. It is so with the second nature,
... in all things which relate to it. Thus
... ant of the usual proportions in men and o
... animals is sure to disgust, though their presenc
... y no means any cause of real pleasure. It is t
... hat the proportions laid down as causes of be
... n the human body, are frequently found in b
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... mankind ; but if it can be shewn too, that the
... found without beauty, and that beauty frequ
... exists without them, and that this beauty, '
... it exists, always can be assigned to other less
... vocal causes, it will naturally lead us to con
... that proportion and beauty are not ideas of th
... nature. The true opposite to beauty is not
... vortion or deformity, but *ugliness* ; and, as
... opposite to those of ;

this opinion, it had been impossible for the doctrine of proportion to have held its ground very long; the world would be soon weary of hearing of measures which related to nothing either of a natural principle, or of a fitness to answer some end; the idea which mankind most commonly conceive of proportion, is the suitableness of means to certain ends, and, where this is not the question, very seldom trouble themselves about the effect of different measures of things. Therefore it was necessary for this theory to insist, that not only artificial, but natural objects, took their beauty from the fitness of the parts for their several purposes. But in framing this theory, I am apprehensive that experience was not sufficiently consulted; for, on that principle, the wedge-like snout of a swine, with its tough cartilage at the end, the little sunk eyes, and the whole make of the head, so well adapted to its offices of digging and rooting, would be extremely beautiful. The great bag hanging to the bill of a pelican, a thing highly useful to this animal, would be likewise as beautiful in our eyes. The hedgehog, so well secured against all assaults by his prickly hide, and the porcupine with his missile quills, would be then considered as creatures of no small elegance. There are few animals whose parts are better contrived than those of a monkey: he has the hands of a man, joined to the springy limbs of a beast: he is admirably calculated for running, leaping, grappling, and climbing; and yet there are few animals which seem to have less beauty in the eyes of all mankind. I need say little on the trunk of the elephant, of such various usefulness, and which is so far from contributing to its beauty. *How well fitted is the wolf for running and leaping! how admirably is the lion armed for battle! but will any*

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before, very long before I cons
his form for the aerial life, I
treme beauty which raises th
the best flying fowls in the w

lities of a Venus and Hercules, so totally different in almost all respects, is surely a strange confusion of ideas, or abuse of words. The cause of this confusion, I imagine, proceeds from our frequently perceiving the parts of the human and other animal bodies to be at once very beautiful, and very well adapted to their purposes; and we are deceived by a sophism, which makes us take that for a cause which is only concomitant: this is the sophism of the fly, who imagined he raised a great dust because he stood upon the chariot that really raised it. The stomach, the lungs, the liver, as well as other parts, are incomparably well adapted to their purposes; yet they are far from having any beauty. Again, many things are very beautiful, in which it is impossible to discern any idea of use. And I appeal to the first and most natural feeling of mankind, whether, on beholding a beautiful eye, or a well-fashioned mouth, or a well-turned leg, any ideas of their being well-fitted for seeing, eating, or running, ever present themselves? What idea of use is it that flowers excite, the most beautiful part of the vegetable world? It is true that the infinitely wise and good Creator has, of his bounty, frequently joined beauty to those things which he has made useful to us: but this does not prove that an idea of use and beauty are the same thing, or that they are any way dependent on each other.

SECT. VII.—THE REAL EFFECTS OF FITNESS.

WHEN I excluded proportion and fitness from any share in beauty, I did not, by any means, intend to say that they were of no value, or that they ought to be disregarded in works of art. Works of art are the proper sphere of their power; and here

scuses and imagination, c:
the understanding is ready
or to oppose them. It is b
much study that we discov
of God in his works : wher
fect is very different, not ou
quiring it, but in its own n
strikes us without any prepa
or the beautiful. How diffe
of the anatomist, who discov
cles and of the skin, the ex
the one for the various move
the wonderful texture of the
ral covering, and at once a g
inlet; how different is this fr
possesses an ordinary man a
cate smooth skin, and all the
which require no investigatio
the former case, and the latter

itself, produce approbation, the acquiescence & understanding, but not love, nor any passion at species. When we examine the structure of a watch, when we come to know thoroughly the form of every part of it, satisfied as we are with the mechanism of the whole, we are far enough from perceiving any thing like beauty in the watch-work itself; but let us look on the case, the labour of some great artist in engraving, with little or no idea of mechanism, we shall have a much livelier idea of beauty than we ever could have had from the watch itself, though it be the masterpiece of Graham. In beauty, as in science, said, the effect is previous to any knowledge of the cause; but, to judge of proportion, we must know the end for which any work is designed. According to the end, the proportion varies. Thus, there is a different proportion of a tower, another of a house; one of a gallery, another of a hall, another of a chamber. To judge of the proportions of these, we must be first acquainted with the purposes for which they were designed. Good sense and experience acting together, find out what is fit to be in every work of art. We are rational creatures, and in all our works we ought to regard their end and purpose: the gratification of any passion, innocent soever, ought only to be of secondary consideration. Herein is placed the real power of taste and proportion; they operate on the understanding considering them, which *approves* the work and acquiesces in it. The passions, and the imagination which principally raises them, have here little to do. When a room appears in its original nakedness, bare walls and a plain ceiling, let the proportion be ever so excellent, it pleases very little; a cold approbation is the utmost we can reach; but in a worse proportioned room, with elegant

by no means to persuade people to neglect the idea of use in the work to shew, that these excellent proportion, are not the same; neither of them be disregarded.

SECT. VIII.—THE RECAP

ON the whole; if such parts are found proportioned, were found beautiful, as they certainly were so situated as that a part from the comparison, which there if any assignable proportions were plants or animals, which were with beauty, which never was that parts were well adapted to their purpose constantly beautiful, and when there was no beauty, which is co

SECT. IX.—PERFECTION NOT THE CAUSE
OF BEAUTY.

THERE is another notion current, pretty closely allied to the former, that *perfection* is the constituent cause of beauty. This opinion has been made to extend much farther than to sensible objects. But in these, so far is perfection, considered as such, from being the cause of beauty, that this quality, where it is highest, in the female sex, almost always carries with it an idea of weakness and imperfection. Women are very sensible of this; for which reason they learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, to counterfeit weakness, and even sickness. In all this they are guided by nature. Beauty in distress is much the most affecting beauty. Blushing has little less power; and modesty in general, which is a tacit allowance of imperfection, is itself considered as an amiable quality, and certainly heightens every other that is so. I know it is in every body's mouth that we ought to love perfection. This is to me a sufficient proof, that it is not the proper object of love. Whoever said we *ought* to love a fine woman, or even any of these beautiful animals which please us? Here to be affected, there is no need of the concurrence of our will.

SECT. X.—HOW FAR THE IDEA OF BEAUTY
MAY BE APPLIED TO THE QUALITIES OF THE
MIND.

NOR is this remark, in general, less applicable to the qualities of the mind. Those virtues which cause admiration, and are of the sublimer kind, produce terror rather than love; such as fortitude, justice, wisdom, and the like. Never was any man,

nishments, and troubles; and in preventing the worst mischief favours; and are, therefore highly venerable. The subord gratifications, and indulgencie more lovely, though inferior in sons who creep into the hearts are chosen as the companions and their reliefs from care and persons of shining qualities no is rather the soft green of the rest our eyes, that are fatig more glaring objects. It is worth feel ourselves affected in reading Cæsar and Cato, as they are so trusted in Sallust. In one, the *ig* in the other, *nil largiundo*. In *fugium*; in the other, *malis per*

him that we have for our mothers, where the paternal authority is almost melted down into the mother's fondness and indulgence. But we generally have a great love for our grandfathers, in whom this authority is removed a degree from us, and where the weakness of age mellows it into something of a feminine partiality.

SECT. XI.—HOW FAR THE IDEA OF BEAUTY
MAY BE APPLIED TO VIRTUE.

FROM what has been said in the foregoing section, we may easily see how far the application of beauty to virtue may be made with propriety. The general application of this quality to virtue has a strong tendency to confound our ideas of things; and it has given rise to an infinite deal of whimsical theory; as the affixing the name of beauty to proportion, congruity, and perfection, as well as to qualities of things yet more remote from our natural ideas of it, and from one another, has tended to confound our ideas of beauty, and left us no standard or rule to judge by, that was not even more uncertain and fallacious than our own fancies. This loose and inaccurate manner of speaking has therefore misled us both in the theory of taste and of morals; and induced us to remove the science of our duties from their proper basis (our reason, our relations, and our necessities), to rest it upon foundations altogether visionary and unsubstantial.

SECT. XII.—THE REAL CAUSE OF BEAUTY.

HAVING endeavoured to shew what beauty is not, it remains that we should examine, at least with equal attention, in what it really consists. Beauty

chanically upon the human mind
tion of the senses. We ought, to
sider attentively in what manner
qualities are disposed, in such th
rience, we find beautiful, or which
passion of love, or some correspon

SECT. XIII.—BEAUTIFUL OBJECTS

THE most obvious point that presents
in examining any object, is its extent.
And what degree of extent prevails
are held beautiful may be gathered from
manner of expression concerning it.
In most languages, the objects of love
under diminutive epithets. It is strange
guages of which I have any knowledge
the *amoris* and other diminutive terms
ways the terms of affection and tenderness.

useful thing is a manner of expression
 sed; but that of a great ugly thing,
 ion. There is a wide difference betw
 ion and love. The sublime, which is t
 he former, always dwells on great objec
 ble; the latter on small ones and pl
 submit to what we admire, but we love
 its to us; in one case we are forced, i
 e are flattered, into compliance. In
 eas of the sublime and the beautifu
 undations so different, that it is hard, I
 id impossible, to think of reconciling th
 me subject, without considerably les
 ect of the one or the other upon the pa
 at, attending to their quantity, beauti
 comparatively small.

SECT. XIV.—SMOOTHNESS.

without it. This seems to me so evident a good deal surprised that none who the subject have made any mention of smoothness in the enumeration of to the forming of beauty; for, indeed any sudden projection, any sharp at highest degree contrary to the idea.

SECT. XV.—GRADUAL VARI

BUT as perfectly beautiful bodies are of angular parts, so their parts never in the same right line.* They vary every moment, and they change undeviation continually carrying on, beginning or end you will find it certain a point. The view of a beauty illustrate this observation. Here we increasing insensibly to the middle.

ription, I have before me the idea of a dove; agrees very well with most of the conditions of beauty. It is smooth and downy; its parts are, to that expression, melted into one another; you are presented with no sudden protuberance through the whole, and yet the whole is continually changing.

Observe that part of a beautiful woman, where the neck joins the breast; the smoothness; the softness; the insensible swell; the variety of the surface, which is never, for the smallest space, the same; the deceitful maze, through which the undulating eye slides giddily, without knowing where it is, or whither it is carried. Is not this a demonstration of that change of surface, continual, yet hardly perceptible at any point, which is one of the great constituents of beauty? It gives me no small pleasure to find that I can strengthen my theory in this point by the opinion of the very ingenious Mr. Hogarth, whose idea of the line of beauty I take in general to be extremely correct: but the idea of variation, without attending accurately to the *manner* of the variation, has led me to consider angular figures as beautiful; these, however, it is true, vary greatly: yet they vary in a sudden and broken manner; and I do not find any natural object which is angular, and at the same time beautiful. Indeed few natural objects are entirely angular; but I think those which approach most nearly to it are the ugliest. I must add, that, so far as I could observe of nature, though the varied line is that alone in which complete beauty is found, yet there is no particular line which is always found in the most completely beautiful, and which is therefore beautiful in preference to other lines; at least I never could observe it.

It is not the oak, the elm, the
robust trees of the forest, which we consider
beautiful; they are awful and majestic; they in-
spire a sort of reverence. It is the delicate
it is the orange, it is the almond, it is the jess
it is the vine, which we look on as vegetable
ties. It is the flowery species, so remarkable
its weakness and momentary duration, that give
the liveliest idea of beauty and elegance.
animals, the greyhound is more beautiful than
mastiff; and the delicacy of a jennet, a bar
Arabian horse, is much more amiable than
strength and stability of some horses of war
riage. I need here say little of the fair sex
I believe the point will be easily allowed that
beauty of women is considerably owing to
weakness or delicacy, and is even enhanced by
their timidity, a quality of mind analogous to
would not here be understood to say, that

SECT. XVII.—BEAUTY IN COLOUR.

the colours usually found in beautiful bodies, may be somewhat difficult to ascertain them, because, in the several parts of nature, there is an infinity of variety. However, even in this variety, we may mark out something on which to settle. First, the colours of beautiful bodies must not be dusky and muddy, but clean and fair. Secondly, they must be of the strongest kind. Those which seem appropriated to beauty are the milder of every kind, light greens; soft blues; weak whites; pink and violets. Thirdly, if the colours be strong and vivid, they are always diversified, and the object never of one strong colour; there are almost always such a number of them (as in variegated flowers), that the strength and glare of each is considerably abated. In a fine complexion, there is only some variety in the colouring, but the colours: neither the red nor the white are strong and glaring. Besides, they are mixed in such a manner and with such gradations, that it is impossible to fix the bounds. On the same principle it is, that the dubious colour in the necks and tails of ducks, and about the heads of drakes, is so very agreeable. In reality, the beauty, both of shape and colouring, are as nearly related as we can well suppose it possible for things of such different nature to be.

SECT. XVIII.—RECAPITULATION.

In the whole, the qualities of beauty, as they are generally sensible qualities, are the following. First, to be comparatively small. Secondly, to be smooth. Thirdly, to have a variety in the direction of the surface, but, fourthly, to have those parts not angular.

perties that operate by
to be altered by caprice, or confounded by
sity of tastes, than any other.

SECT. XIX.—THE PHYSIOGNOMY.

THE *Physiognomy* has a considerable al
beauty, especially in that of our own specie
manners give a certain determination to the
nance; which, being observed to correspon
regularly with them, is capable of joining tl
of certain agreeable qualities of the mind
of the body; so that, to form a finishe
beauty, and to give it its full influence,
must be expressive of such gentle and
qualities, as correspond with the softnes
ness, and delicacy of the outward form.

SECT. XX.—THE EYE.

the eye with the neighbouring parts, it is the same rule that is given of other beauty: it is not to make a strong deviation from the neighbouring parts; nor to verge from the exact geometrical figure. Besides all this, it affects, as it is expressive of some quality in the mind, and its principal power generally arises, so that what we have just said of the theory is applicable here.

SECT. XXI.—UGLINESS.

It may perhaps appear like a sort of repetition to have before said, to insist here upon the *Ugliness*, as I imagine it to be in all respects opposite to those qualities which we have laid down as the constituents of beauty. But, though it is the opposite to beauty, it is not the opposite in proportion and fitness; for it is possible that it may be very ugly without being very beautiful.

the parts in such a manner as not to en
other, nor to appear divided by shar
angles. In this ease, this roundness,
of attitude and motion, it is that all
grace consists, and what is called its j
as will be obvious to any observer w
attentively the Venus de Medicis, the
any statue generally allowed to be
high degree.

SECT. XXIII.—ELEGANCE AND SPI

WHEN any body is composed of part
polished, without pressing upon each
out shewing any ruggedness or conf
the same time affecting some *regular*
it *elegant*. It is closely allied to the
fering from it only in this *regularity*;
ever, as it makes a very material diff

vacuum in resting. It corresponds with what causes the same species of pleasure to the sight. There is a chain in all our sensations; they are all but different sorts of feelings, and all are affected by various sorts of objects, and all are affected after the same manner. All bodies that are pleasant to the touch are so by the slight resistance they make. Resistance is either to the motion along the surface, or to the pressure of one part on another; if the former be slight, the body is smooth; if the latter, soft. The pleasure we receive by feeling is in the order of these qualities; and, if there be a combination of both, our pleasure is greatly increased. This is so plain, that it is rather more fit to illustrate other things, than to be illustrated itself by any other. The next source of pleasure in this kind is in every other, is the continually presenting of somewhat new; and we find that bodies which

...
n feeling soft, smooth, variegated, ~~un-
ing~~—
ies, with that in which he finds himself, o
view of a beautiful object, will perceive a very
ng analogy in the effects of both, and which
30 a good way towards discovering their com-
cause. Feeling and sight, in this respect, di-
but a few points. The touch takes in the pl-
of softness, which is not primarily an object of
the sight, on the other hand, comprehends
which can hardly be made perceptible to the
the touch again has the advantage in a ne-
of pleasure resulting from a moderate de-
warmth; but the eye triumphs in the infinite
and multiplicity of its objects. But there is
similitude in the pleasures of these senses
am apt to fancy, if it were possible that one
discern colour by feeling (as, it is said, some
men have done), that the same colours, and
... of colouring which are found |

Of linked sweetness long, drawn out
With wanton heed and giddy cunning;
The melting voice through mazes running,
Untwisting all the chains that tie
The hidden soul of harmony.

Let us parallel this with the softness, the
 surface, the unbroken continuance, the e
 ation of the beautiful in other things; an
 iversities of the several senses, with all t
 oral affections, will rather help to throw lig
 ie another to finish one clear consistent
 e whole, than to obscure it by their intric
 riety.

To the abovementioned description I sh
 e or two remarks. The first is, that the be
 music will not bear that loudness and stre
 nds which may be used to raise other pa
 : notes, which are shrill, or harsh, or de
 ees best with such as are clear, even, an
 l weak. The second is, that

to this, to clear and distinguish singulars that belong to the same class consistent with each other, from the inconsistent of different, and sometimes contradictory rank vulgarly under the standard of these it is my intention to mark the leading points as shew the conformity of hearing, with all the other sense of their pleasures.

SECT. XXVI.—TASTE AND

THIS general agreement of the sense is evident on minutely considering the smell. We metaphorically apply the sense to sights and sounds; but as bodies, by which they are fitted to excite pleasure or pain in these senses, are not the same as they are in the others, we shall refer

or witness to each other; nature is, as it
routinized: and we report nothing of her, but
receive from her own information.

XVII.—THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL
COMPARED.

In this general view of beauty, it naturally
that we should compare it with the sublime;
this comparison there appears a remarkable
; for sublime objects are vast in their dimen-
beautiful ones comparatively small; beauty
is smooth and polished; the great, rugged
vigilant; beauty should shun the right line,
steer from it insensibly; the great, in many
cases the right line; and when it deviates,
makes a strong deviation: beauty should
be obscure: the great ought to be dark and
beauty should be light and delicate: the
ought to be solid, and even massive. They
are, ideas of a very different nature, one
founded on pain, the other on pleasure; and
they may vary afterward from the direct
of their causes, yet these causes keep up an
distinction between them, a distinction never
gotten by any whose business it is to affect
ours. In the infinite variety of natural com-
binations, we must expect to find the qualities of
the most remote imaginable from each other,
in the same object. We must expect also to
find combinations of the same kind in the works of
nature when we consider the power of an object
to excite passions, we must know, that when any
object is intended to affect the mind by the force of
a dominant property, the affection produced
will be the more uniform and perfect, if all the
properties or qualities of the object be of the

way allied; does it prove
opposite and contradictory? Black and white
soften, may blend; but they are not therefore
same. Nor, when they are so softened and blended
with each other, or with different colours
power of black as black, or of white as white
strong as when each stands uniform and
guished.

PART IV.

SECT. I.—OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL.

WHEN I say I intend to inquire into the
cause of sublimity and beauty, I would be
derstood to say that I can come to the
cause. I do not pretend that I shall ever
why certain affections of the

... the most remarkable phenomena
are ; but yet, with reference to the general
of things, he could consider attraction to be
fect, whose cause, at that time, he did
empt to trace. But when he afterward began
out for it by a subtile elastic æther, this gave
if in so great a man it be not impious to
ay thing like a blemish) seemed to have
is usual cautious manner of philosophizing
rhaps, allowing all that has been advanced
is subject to be sufficiently proved, I think
ives us with as many difficulties as it for
at great chain of causes, linking one to another
n to the throne of God himself, can never be
avelled by any industry of ours. When we
one step beyond the immediately sensible
s of things, we go out of our depth. All
r is but a faint struggle, that shews we are
element which does not belong to the material
n. I am, Sir, your obedient servant.

many of them are given, and that motions are communicated at a time not capacity to reflect on them; at all sort of memory is worn out of besides such things as affect us in according to their natural powers, ciations made at that early season it very hard afterward to distinguish effects. Not to mention the unapathies which we find in many people it impossible to remember when more terrible than a plain; or fire dreadful than a clod of earth; though very probably either conclusions from or arising from the premonitions some of them impressed, in all late. But as it must be allowed to affect us after a certain manner, not

SECT. III.—CAUSE OF PAIN AND FEAR.

before observed,* that whatever is qualified to excite terror, is a foundation capable of the sublimity which I add, that not only these, but many others from which we cannot probably apprehend danger, have a similar effect, because they operate in a similar manner. I observe too, that terror produces pleasure, positive and original, and is fit to have beauty engrafted on it. In order, to clear up the nature of these qualities, it will be necessary to explain the nature of pain and pleasure, on which they depend. A man who is under violent bodily pain (I suppose the most violent, because the effect may be the more striking), I say, a man in great pain has his teeth clenched, his eyebrows are violently contracted, his forehead wrinkled, his eyes are dragged inwards and with great vehemence, his hair stands on end, his voice is forced out in short shrieks and groans, and the whole fabric totters. Fear or terror, which is an apprehension of pain or death, excites exactly the same effects, approaching in violence to those just mentioned, in proportion to the violence of the cause and the weakness of the subject. This is not only so in the human species: we have more than once observed in dogs under apprehension of punishment, that they have quivered their bodies, and yelped and howled, as if they had actually felt the blows. From whence I conclude, that pain and fear act upon the same parts of the body, and in the same manner, though sometimes differing in degree; that pain and fear consist in an unnatural tension of the nerves; that this is always accompanied with an unnatural strength,

Part I. sect. 2.

† *Part I. sect. 10.*

mind by the intervention of the b
things that cause terror generally aff
organs by the operation of the mind
danger; but both agreeing, either p
condarily, in producing a tension, c
violent emotion of the nerves,* they
in every thing else; for it appears v
me, from this, as well as from many o
that when the body is disposed, by an
soever, to such emotions as it would
means of a certain passion, it will
something very like that passion in

SECT. IV.—THE SAME SUBJECT C

To this purpose Mr. Spon, in his *Re
tiquité*, gives us a curious story of
physiognomist Campanella. This i
had not only made very accurate c

to examine : and then carefully observed what turn of mind he seemed to acquire by this change ; so that, says my author, he was able to enter into the dispositions and thoughts of people, as effectually as if he had been changed into the very men. I have often observed, that, on mimicking the looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frightened, or daring men, I have involuntarily found my mind turned to that passion whose appearance I endeavoured to imitate ; nay, I am convinced it is hard to avoid it, though one strove to separate the passion from its correspondent gestures. Our minds and bodies are so closely and intimately connected, that one is incapable of pain or pleasure without the other. Campanella, of whom we have been speaking, could so abstract his attention from any sufferings of his body, that he was able to endure the rack itself without much pain : and, in lesser pains, every body must have observed, that when we can employ our attention on any thing else, the pain has been for a time suspended : on the other hand, if by any means, the body is indisposed to perform such gestures, or to be stimulated into such emotions as any passion usually produces in it, that passion itself never can arise, though its cause should be ever so strongly in action ; though it should be merely mental, and immediately affecting none of the senses. As an opiate, or spirituous liquors, shall suspend the operation of grief, or fear, or anger, in spite of all our efforts to the contrary, and this by inducing in the body a disposition contrary to that which it receives from these passions.

SECT. V.—HOW THE SUBLIME IS PRODUCED.

HAVING considered terror as producing an unnatural tension and certain violent emotions of the

showing the cause of it. —
 In instances we have given of it, it
 does not relate to such things as are fitted by nature to
 produce this sort of tension, either by the primary
 operation of the mind or the body. With regard to
 such things as affect by the associated idea of dan-
 ger, there can be no doubt but that they produce
 error, and act by some modification of that passion
 and that terror, when sufficiently violent, raises the
 emotions of the body just mentioned, can as little
 be doubted. But, if the sublime is built on terror, or
 some passion like it, which has pain for its object,
 it is previously proper to inquire how any species
 of delight can be derived from a cause so apparently
 contrary to it. I say, *delight*, because, as I have
 often remarked, it is very evidently different in
 cause, and in its own nature, from actual and positive
 pleasure.

——— HOW PAIN CAN BE A CAUSE

forming their functions, but takes away the vigorous tone of fibre which is requisite for carrying on the natural and necessary secretions. At the same time that in this languid and inactive state, the nerves are more liable to the most horrid convulsions than when they are sufficiently braced and strengthened. Melancholy, dejection, despair, and often self-murder, is the consequence of the gloomy view we take of things in this relaxed state of body. The best remedy for all these evils is exercise or labour; and labour is a surmounting of difficulties, an exertion of the contracting power of the muscles; and, as such, resembles pain, which consists in tension or contraction, in every thing but degree. Labour is not only requisite to preserve the coarse organs in a state fit for their functions; but it is equally necessary to these finer and more delicate organs, on which, and by which, the imagination, perhaps the other mental powers, act. Since it is probable, that not only the inferior parts of the soul, as the passions are called, but the understanding itself, makes use of some fine corporeal instruments in its operation; though what they are, and where they are, may be somewhat hard to settle; but that it does make use of such, appears from hence, that a long exercise of the mental powers induces a remarkable lassitude of the whole body; and, on the other hand, that great bodily labour, or pain, weakens, and sometimes actually destroys, the mental faculties. Now, as a due exercise is essential to the coarse muscular parts of the constitution, and that, without this rousing, they would become languid and diseased, the very same rule holds with regard to those finer parts we have mentioned: to have them in proper order, they must be shaken and worked to a proper degree.

upon the eye or the ear, as they are
sensitive organs, the affection approaches
to that which has a mental cause.
cases, if the pain and terror are so m
to be actually noxious; if the pain is
violence, and the terror is not conven
present destruction of the person, as t
clear the parts, whether due or gross
ous and troublesome incumbrance, th
of producing del ight; not pleasure,
delightful horror, a sort of tranquill
terror; which, as it belongs to self;
one of the strongest of all the passio
is the sublime.* Its highest degree
ment; the subordinate degrees are a
and respect, which, by the very ety
words, shew from what source they a
how they stand distinguished from po

PT. IX.—WHY VISUAL OBJECTS OF GREAT
DIMENSIONS ARE SUBLIME.

VISION is performed by having a picture formed by rays of light which are reflected from the object in one piece, instantaneously, on the first or last nervous part of the eye. Or, according to others, there is but one point of any object which is reflected on the eye in such a manner as to be perceived at once; but, by moving the eye, we gather up with great celerity the several parts of the object as to form one uniform piece. If the former be allowed, it will be considered, that all the light reflected from a large body strikes the eye in one instant, yet we are conscious that the body itself is formed of a multitude of distinct points, every one of which is perceived from every angle.

must be very much strained; and the
bility must make them highly affecte
ing. Besides, it signifies just noth
produced, whether a body has its
and makes its impression at once;
one impression of a point at a ti
succession of the same or others;
make them seem united; as is ev
common effect of whirling about a
piece of wood, which, if done with c
circle of fire.

SECT. X.—UNITY WHY REQUISITE

IT may be objected to this theory, t
nerally receives an equal number
times, and that, therefore, a great
affect it by the number of rays, mon
riety of objects which the eye must

no means productive of ease; neither has it the effect of vigorous and uniform labour. Whoever has remarked the different effects of some strong exercise, and some little piddling action, will understand why a teasing fretful employment, which at once wearies and weakens the body, should have nothing great; these sorts of impulses, which are rather teasing than painful, by continually and suddenly altering their tenor and direction, prevent that full tension, that species of uniform labour, which is allied to strong pain, and causes the sublime. The sum total of things of various kinds, though it should equal the number of the uniform parts composing some *one* entire object, is not equal in its effects upon the organs of our bodies. Besides the one already assigned, there is another very strong reason for the difference. The mind in reality, hardly ever can attend diligently to more than one thing at a time; if this thing be little, the effect is little, and a number of other little objects cannot engage the attention; the mind is bounded by the bounds of the object; and what is not attended to, and what does not exist, are much the same in the effect: but the eye, or the mind (for in this case there is no difference), in great uniform objects, does not readily arrive at their bounds; it has no rest, whilst it contemplates them; the image is much the same every where: so that every thing great by its quantity must necessarily be one, simple and entire.

SECT. XI.—THE ARTIFICIAL INFINITE.

WE have observed, that a species of greatness arises from the artificial infinite; and that this *infinite consists in a uniform succession of great*

the cause of the sound, more obvious in the sense of hearing. Here once for all observe, that an investigation of the natural and mechanical causes of our passion besides the curiosity of the subject, gives, if they are discovered, a double strength and lustre to all the rules we deliver on such matters. When the ear receives any simple sound, it is struck by a single pulse of the air, which makes the ear-drum and all other membranous parts vibrate according to the nature and species of the stroke. If the stroke is strong, the organ of hearing suffers a considerable degree of tension. If the stroke be repeated soon after, the repetition causes an expectation of another stroke. And it must be observed, that expectation itself causes a tension. This is apparent in many animals, who, when they prepare to hear any sound, rouse themselves, and prick up their ears; so that here the effect of the sound is assisted by a new auxiliary.

and the whole body consented with it. The tension of the part thus increasing at every blow, by the united forces of the stroke itself, the expectation, and the surprise, it is worked up to such a pitch as to be capable of the sublime; it is brought just to the verge of pain. Even when the cause has ceased, the organs of hearing, being often successively struck in a similar manner, continue to vibrate in that manner for some time longer; this is an additional help to the greatness of the effect.

SECT. XII.—THE VIBRATIONS MUST BE SIMILAR.

BUT if the vibration be not similar at every impression, it can never be carried beyond the number of actual impressions; for, move any body as a pendulum, in one way, and it will continue to oscillate in an arch of the same circle, until the known causes make it rest; but if, after first putting it in motion in one direction, you push it into another, it can never resume the first direction, because it can never move itself, and consequently it can have but the effect of that last motion; whereas, if in the same direction you act upon it several times, it will describe a greater arch, and move a longer time.

SECT. XIII.—THE EFFECT OF SUCCESSION IN VISUAL OBJECTS EXPLAINED.

IF we can comprehend clearly how things operate upon one of our senses, there can be very little difficulty in conceiving in what manner they affect the rest. To say a great deal, therefore, upon the corresponding affections of every sense, would tend rather to fatigue us, by a useless repetition, than to throw any new light upon the subject, by that

... every variation of t
event to the organs of si
the sublime. To produ
grandeur in such things as
there should be a perfe
uniformity in dispositio
Upon this principle of s
it may be asked, why a
be a more sublime obje
the eye meets no check;
uniform can be conceived
certainly not so grand an
same length and height
difficult to account for this
out a naked wall, from th
eye runs along its wh
quickly at its termination
which may interrupt its
nothing which may

1. *Mass & Comp.*

produce a grander effect than a mass of objects
ity disposed in another manner. To avoid the pe-
plexity of general notions, let us set before our eye
a colonnade of uniform pillars planted in a right
line; let us take our stand in such a manner that
the eye may shoot along this colonnade, for it has
its best effect in this view. In our present situa-
tion, it is plain that the rays from the first round
pillar will cause in the eye a vibration of that ap-
pearance; an image of the pillar itself. The pillar im-
mediately succeeding increases it; that which fol-
lows renews and enforces the impression; each
in its order, as it succeeds, repeats impulse after im-
pulse, and stroke after stroke, until the eye, being
exercised in one particular way, cannot lose the
object immediately; and being violently roused by
this continued agitation, it presents the mind with
a grand or sublime conception. But instead of
a mass of uniform pillars, let us sup-

pillar, the impression is as far from continuing as it was at the very first; because, in fact, the sensory can receive no distinct impression but from the last; and it can never of itself resume a dissimilar impression: besides, every variation of the object is a rest and relaxation to the organs of sight; and these reliefs prevent that powerful emotion so necessary to produce the sublime. To produce, therefore, a perfect grandeur in such things as we have been mentioning, there should be a perfect simplicity, an absolute uniformity in disposition, shape, and colouring. Upon this principle of succession and uniformity it may be asked, why a long bare wall should not be a more sublime object than a colonnade; since the succession is no way interrupted; since the eye meets no check; since nothing more uniform can be conceived? A long bare wall is certainly not so grand an object as a colonnade of the same length and height. It is not altogether difficult to account for this difference. When we look at a naked wall, from the evenness of the object, the eye runs along its whole space, and arrives quickly at its termination; the eye meets nothing which may interrupt its progress; but then it meets nothing which may detain it a proper time to produce a very great and lasting effect. The view of a bare wall, if it be of a great height and length, is undoubtedly grand: but this is only *one* idea, and not a *repetition* of *similar* ideas; it is therefore great, not so much upon the principle of *infinity*, as upon that of *vastness*. But we are not so powerfully affected with any one impulse, unless it be one of a prodigious force indeed, as we are with a succession of similar impulses; *because the nerves of the sensory do not (if I may use the expression) acquire a habit of repeating the*

DARKNESS CONSIDERED

It is Mr. Locke's opinion, that darkness is naturally an idea of terror; and that excessive light is painful to the senses. The greatest excess of darkness is no ways painful. As a man observes, indeed, in another place, or an old woman, having once seen a vision of ghosts and goblins with that, she never after becomes painful and terrible to the imagination. The authority of this is doubtless as great as that of the sun, and it seems to stand in the way of the principle.* We have considered the cause of the sublime: and we have considered the sublime as depending on the occasion of pain or terror; so that it is not in any way painful or terrible to any who have not their minds early tainted with su-

the first step we take; and, if an enemy approach, we know not in what quarter to defend ourselves; in such a case strength is no sure protection; wisdom can only act by guess; the boldest are staggered; and he who would pray for nothing else towards his defence, is forced to pray for light:

*Ζευ πάτερ, ἀλλὰ σὺ ῥύσαι ὑπ' ἡμερὸς νύκτ' Ἀχαιῶν·
Ποίησον δ' αἶθρην, ὅς σε δ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι·
Ὡς δὲ φάει καὶ Ὀδυσσεύς.—Hom. Il. xvi. 645.*

As to the association of ghosts and goblins, surely it is more natural to think that darkness, being originally an idea of terror, was chosen as a fit scene for such terrible representations, than that such representations have made darkness terrible. The mind of man very easily slides into an error of the former sort; but it is very hard to imagine, that the effect of an idea so universally terrible in all times and in all countries, as darkness, could possibly have been owing to a set of idle stories, or to any cause of a nature so trivial, and of an operation so precarious.

SECT. XV.—DARKNESS TERRIBLE IN ITS OWN NATURE.

PERHAPS it may appear, on inquiry, that blackness and darkness are in some degree painful by their natural operation, independent of any associations whatsoever. I must observe, that the ideas of darkness and blackness are much the same; and they differ only in this, that blackness is a more confined idea. Mr. Cheselden has given us a very curious story of a boy who had been born blind, and continued so until he was thirteen or fourteen years old; he was then couched for a cataract, by which operation he received his sight. Among

posed to arise from any association.
appears by the account, to have been particularly
serving and sensible for one of his age; and th
fore it is probable, if the great uneasiness he fe
the first sight of black had arisen from its connex
with any other disagreeable ideas, he would have
served and mentioned it; for an idea, disagree
only by association, has the cause of its ill effect
the passions evident enough at the first impressi
in ordinary cases, it is indeed frequently lost:
this is because the original association was v
very early, and the consequent impression repe
often. In our instance, there was no time for
a habit; and there is no reason to think tha
ill effects of black on his imagination were
owing to its connexion with any disagreeable
than that the good effects of more cheerful c
were derived from their connexion with pl
both. probably, their effect

light, it is reasonable to think that the contraction of the radial fibres of the iris is proportionably greater; and that this part may, by great darkness, come to be so contracted as to strain the nerves that compose it beyond their natural tone, and by this means to produce a painful sensation. Such a tension, it seems, there certainly is, whilst we are involved in darkness: for, in such a state, whilst the eye remains open, there is a continual nîsus to receive light: this is manifest from the flashes and luminous appearances which often seem, in these circumstances, to play before it, and which can be nothing but the effect of spasms produced by its own efforts in pursuit of its object: several other strong impulses will produce the idea of light in the eye, besides the substance of light itself, as we experience on many occasions. Some who allow darkness to be a cause of the sublime would infer, from the dilation of the pupil, that a relaxation may be productive of the sublime, as well as a convulsion; but they do not, I believe, consider, that although the circular ring of the iris be in some sense a sphincter, which may possibly be dilated by a simple relaxation, yet in one respect it differs from most of the other sphincters of the body, that it is furnished with antagonist muscles, which are the radial fibres of the iris: no sooner does the circular muscle begin to relax, than these fibres, wanting their counterpoise, are forcibly drawn back, and open the pupil to a considerable wideness. But though we were not apprized of this, I believe any one will find, if he opens his eyes and makes an effort to see in a dark place, that a very perceivable pain ensues. And I have heard some ladies remark, that, after having worked a long time upon a ground of black, their eyes were so pained and weakened they could

can seldom complain of this usage.

SECT. XVIII.—THE EFFECTS OF BLACKNESS
MODERATED.

THOUGH the effects of black be painful originally, we must not think they always continue so. Custom reconciles us to every thing. After we have been used to the sight of black objects, the terror abates, and the smoothness and glossiness, or agreeable accident of bodies so coloured, softens some measure, the horror and sternness of original nature; yet the nature of the original impression still continues. Black will always be something melancholy in it, because the senses always find the change to it, from other colours too violent; or, if it occupy the whole compass of the sight, it will then be darkness; and whatever of darkness, will be applicable here. I shall now say what might be said to ill

When we see such objects as
with complacency, the body is affected,
we should observe, much in the following manner
and reclines something on one side; the
mouth more closed than usual, and the eye
with an inclination to the object; the mouth
is little opened, and the breath drawn slowly
and then a low sigh; the whole body
is relaxed, and the hands fall idly to the sides.
This is accompanied with an inward sense of
melancholy languor. These appearances are always
proportioned to the degree of beauty in the object
and sensibility in the observer. And this gradation
runs from the highest pitch of beauty and sensibility
down to the lowest of mediocrity and indifference
and their correspondent effects, ought to be in
view, else this description will seem erroneous
which it certainly is not. But from this
it is almost impossible not to infer

Newton in the third book. -
tion will, I conceive, appear confirmed beyond
reasonable doubt, if we can shew that such things
as we have already observed to be the general
constituents of beauty, have each of them, separately taken, a natural tendency to relax the fibres
And if it must be allowed us, that the appearance
of the human body, when all these constituents
united together before the sensory, further favours
this opinion, we may venture, I believe, to conclude,
that the passion called love is produced by this relaxation.
By the same method of reasoning which we have used
in the inquiry into the cause of the sublime, we may likewise conclude,
that the beautiful object presented to the sense, by causing
a relaxation in the body, produces the passion
love in the mind; so, if by any means the passion
should first have its origin in the mind, a relaxation
of the outward organs will as certainly ensue as the cause.

lity is found, almost without exception, in all the bodies that are by general consent held beautiful. There can be no doubt that bodies, which are rough and angular, rouse and vellicate the organs of feeling, causing a sense of pain, which consists in the violent tension or contraction of the muscular fibres. On the contrary, the application of smooth bodies relax; gentle stroking with a smooth hand allays violent pains and cramps, and relaxes the suffering parts from their unnatural tension; and it has, therefore, very often no mean effect in removing swellings and obstructions. The sense of feeling is highly gratified with smooth bodies. A bed smoothly laid, and soft, that is, where the resistance is every way inconsiderable, is a great luxury, disposing to a universal relaxation, and inducing, beyond any thing else, that species of it called sleep.

SECT. XXI.—SWEETNESS, ITS NATURE.

NOR is it only in the touch that smooth bodies cause positive pleasure by relaxation. In the smell and taste, we find all things agreeable to them, and which are commonly called sweet, to be of a smooth nature, and that they all evidently tend to relax their respective sensories. Let us first consider the taste. Since it is most easy to inquire into the property of liquids, and since all things seem to want a fluid vehicle to make them tasted at all, I intend rather to consider the liquid than the solid parts of our food. The vehicles of all tastes are *water* and *oil*. And what determines the taste is some salt, which affects variously, according to its nature, or its manner of being combined with other things. *Water* and *oil*, simply considered, are capable of giving some pleasure to the taste. *Water*, when

water acts merely as a simple fluid; the cause of its fluidity is likewise its relaxing quality; namely, the slippery texture of its parts. The other tastes is *oil*. This too, when simple, is odourless, colourless, and smooth to the taste. It is smoother than water, and cases yet more relaxing. Oil is insipid to the eye, the touch, and the smell; it is. Water is not so grateful; we know on what principle to account for this. Water is not so soft and smooth. If to this oil or water were added a certain specific salt, which had a power to move the papillæ of the tongue into motion; as suppose sugar dissolved in the smoothness of the oil, and the addition of the salt, cause the sense we call

.. . . .

nature, affects the taste ; for a single globe (though somewhat pleasant to the feeling), yet, by the regularity of its form, and the somewhat too sudden deviation of its parts from a right line, it is nothing near so pleasant to the touch as several globes, where the hand gently rises to one and falls to another : and this pleasure is greatly increased if the globes are in motion and sliding over one another ; for this soft variety prevents that weariness which the uniform disposition of the several globes would otherwise produce. Thus, in sweet liquors, the parts of the fluid vehicle, though most probably round, are yet so minute as to conceal the figure of their component parts from the nicest inquisition of the microscope ; and consequently, being so excessively minute, they have a sort of flat simplicity to the taste, resembling the effects of plain smooth bodies to the touch ; for, if a body be composed of round parts excessively small, and packed pretty closely together, the surface will be both to the sight and touch, as if it were nearly plain and smooth. It is clear, from their unveiling their figure to the microscope, that the particles of sugar are considerably larger than those of water or oil ; and consequently, that their effects from their roundness will be more distinct and palpable to the nervous papillæ of that nice organ the tongue : they will induce that sense called sweetness, which in a weak manner we discover in oil, and in a yet weaker in water ; for insipid as they are, water and oil are in some degree sweet ; and it may be observed, that insipid things of all kinds approach more nearly to the nature of sweetness than to that of any other taste.

douce, in French, signifies soft.

The Latin *dulcis*, and the Itali
many cases, the same double si
sweet things are generally relaxi
cause all such, especially those
oily, taken frequently, or in a
very much enfeeble the tone
Sweet smells, which bear a grea
tastes, relax very remarkably. Th
disposes people to drowsiness;
effect is further apparent from th
people of weak nerves receive fr
were worth while to examine, wh
kind, sweet ones, tastes that are
oils and a relaxing salt, are not
sant tastes; for many, which i
such, were not at all agreeable :
to examine this is, to try what
nally provided for us, which she

tion. Afterwards, custom, habit, the desire of novelty, and a thousand other causes, confound, adulterate, and change our palates, so that we can no longer reason with any satisfaction about them. Before we quit this article, we must observe, that as smooth things are, as such, agreeable to the taste, and are found of a relaxing quality: so on the other hand, things which are found by experience to be of a strengthening quality, and fit to brace the fibres, are, almost universally, rough and pungent to the taste, and, in many cases, rough even to the touch. We often apply the quality of sweetness, metaphorically, to visual objects. For the better carrying on this remarkable analogy of the senses, we may here call sweetness the beautiful of the taste.

SECT. XXIII.—VARIATION, WHY BEAUTIFUL.

ANOTHER principal property of beautiful objects is, that the line of their parts is continually varying its direction; but it varies it by a very insensible deviation; it never varies it so quickly as to surprise, or by the sharpness of its angle to cause any twitching or convulsion of the optic nerve. Nothing long continued in the same manner, nothing very suddenly varied, can be beautiful: because both are opposite to that agreeable relaxation, which is the characteristic effect of beauty. It is thus in all the senses. A motion in a right line is that manner of moving, next to a very gentle descent, in which we meet the least resistance: yet it is not that manner of moving which, next to a descent, wearies us the least. Rest certainly tends to relax; yet there is a species of motion which relaxes more than rest a gentle oscillatory motion, a rising and falling. *Rocking sets children to sleep better than absolute rest; there is indeed scarce any thing at that age*

declivities. This will give a better
beautiful, and point out its probability
than almost any thing else. On the
one is hurried over a rough, rocky
the pain felt by these sudden inequalities
similar slight feelings, and sounds, &c.
to beauty; and with regard to the fe
actly the same in its effect, or very ne
whether, for instance, I move my h
surface of a body of a certain shap
such a body is moved along my hand.
this analogy of the senses home to
body presented to that sense has such
face, that the rays of light reflected fr
continual insensible deviation from th
the weakest (which is always the cas
gradually unequal), it must be exactl
effect on the eye and touch; upon th

SECT. XXIV.—CONCERNING SMALLNESS.

To avoid a sameness which may arise from the too frequent repetition of the same reasonings, and of illustrations of the same nature, I will not enter very minutely into every particular that regards beauty, as it is founded on the disposition of its quantity, or its quantity itself. In speaking of the magnitude of bodies, there is great uncertainty, because the ideas of great and small are terms almost entirely relative to the species of the objects, which are infinite. It is true that, having once fixed the species of any object, and the dimensions common in the individuals of that species, we may observe some that exceed, and some that fall short of the ordinary standard; those which greatly exceed are by that excess, provided the species itself be not very small, rather great and terrible than beautiful; but as in the animal world, and in a good measure in the vegetable world likewise, the qualities that constitute beauty may possibly be united to things of greater dimensions; when they are so united, they constitute a species something different both from the sublime and beautiful, which I have before called *Fine*; but this kind, I imagine, has not such a power on the passions, either as vast bodies have which are endued with the correspondent qualities of the sublime; or as the qualities of beauty have when united in a small object. The affection produced by large bodies, adorned with the spoils of beauty, is a tension continually relieved, which approaches to the nature of mediocrity. But if I were to say how I find myself affected upon such occasions, I should say that the sublime suffers less by being united to some of the

or, at most, exerted to multiply the r.
ness of the terror, which is the natu
of greatness. Besides the extrao
every species, the opposite to this, t
diminutive, ought to be consider
merely as such, has nothing contrai
beauty. The humming bird, both
colouring, yields to none of the wi
which it is the least; and perhaps l
hanced by his smallness. But the
which when they are extremely s
(if ever) beautiful. There is a dwa
and women, which is almost con
and massive in comparison of their l
present us with a very disagreeat
should a man be found not above t
high, supposing such a person to h
of his body of a delicacy suitable
and otherwise endued with the com

suppose a giant the object of love. When we let our imagination loose in romance, the ideas we naturally annex to that size are those of tyranny, cruelty, injustice, and every thing horrid and abominable. We paint the giant ravaging the country, plundering the innocent traveller, and afterward gorged with his half-living flesh: such are Polyphemus, Cacus, and others, who make so great a figure in romances and heroic poems. The event we attend to, with the greatest satisfaction, is their defeat and death. I do not remember, in all that multitude of deaths with which the Iliad is filled, that the fall of any man remarkable for his great stature and strength touches us with pity; nor does it appear that the author, so well read in human nature, ever intended it should. It is Simoisius in the soft bloom of youth, torn from his parents, who tremble for a courage so ill suited to his strength; it is another hurried by war from the new embraces of his bride, young and fair, and a novice to the field, who melts us by his untimely fate. Achilles, in spite of the many qualities of beauty which Homer has bestowed on his outward form, and the many great virtues with which he has adorned his mind, can never make us love him. It may be observed, that Homer has given the Trojans, whose fate he has designed to excite our compassion, infinitely more of the amiable social virtues than he has distributed among his Greeks. With regard to the Trojans, the passion he chooses to raise is pity; pity is a passion founded on love: and these *lesser*, and if I may say domestic, virtues, are certainly the most amiable. But he has made the Greeks far their superiors in politic and military virtues. The *councils of Priam* are weak; the arms of Hector *comparatively feeble*; his courage far below that of

t wholly beside our purpose,
 to shew that objects of great dimensions are u
 mpatible with beauty, the more incompatible s
 ey are greater; whereas the small, if ever the
 ail of beauty, this failure is not to be attributed t
 heir size.

SECT. XXV.—OF COLOUR.

WITH regard to colour, the disquisition is almo
 infinite; but, I conceive, the principles laid dov
 in the beginning of this part are sufficient to accou
 for the effects of them all, as well as for the agr
 able effects of transparent bodies, whether fluid
 solid. Suppose I look at a bottle of muddy liqr
 of a blue or red colour: the blue or red rays can
 pass clearly to the eye, but are suddenly and
 equally stopped by the intervention of little op
 bodies, which, without preparation, change the i
 into one disagreeable in its

may be heightened by the common principles in other things, if the shape of the glass which holds the transparent liquor be so judiciously varied as to present the colour gradually and interchangeably weakened and strengthened with all the variety which judgment, in affairs of this nature, shall suggest. On a review of all that has been said of the effects, as well as the causes of both, it will appear that the sublime and beautiful are built on principles very different, and that their affections are as different: the great has terror for its basis, which, when it is modified, causes that emotion in the mind which I have called astonishment: the beautiful is founded on mere positive pleasure, and excites in the soul that feeling which is called love. Their causes have made the subject of this Fourth Part.

PART V.

SECT. I.—OF WORDS.

NATURAL objects affect us by the laws of that connexion which Providence has established between certain motions and configurations of bodies, and certain consequent feelings in our minds. Painting affects in the same manner, but with the superadded pleasure of imitation. Architecture affects by the laws of nature, and the law of reason: from which latter result the rules of proportion, which make a work to be praised or censured, in the whole or in some part, when the end for which it was designed is or is not properly answered. But as to words, they seem to me to affect us in a manner *very different from that in which we are affected by natural objects, or by painting or architecture;*

SECT. II.—THE COMMON EFFECT OF
NOT BY RAISING IDEAS OF THINGS

THE common notion of the power of eloquence, as well as that of words in conversation, is, that they affect the mind by raising in it ideas of those things for which they are appointed them to stand. To examine this notion, it may be requisite to consider how words may be divided into three sorts. The first are such as represent many simple ideas of a certain nature, to form some one determinate notion, as man, horse, tree, castle, &c. These are called *gate words*. The second are they that represent a simple idea of such compositions, and such as red, blue, round, square, and the like. These are called *simple abstract words*. The third are such as are formed by a union, an *arbitrary union* of the others, and of the various relations

nour, persuasion, docility. Of these I am convinced, that, whatever power they may have on the passions, they do not derive it from any representation raised in the mind of the things for which they stand. As compositions they are not real essences, and hardly cause, I think, any real ideas. Nobody, I believe, immediately on hearing the sounds, virtue, liberty, or honour, conceives any precise notions of the particular mode of action and thinking, together with the mixed and simple ideas, and the several relations of them, for which these words are substituted; neither has he any general idea compounded of them; for if he had, then some of those particular ones, though indistinct, perhaps, and confused, might come soon to be perceived. But this, I take it is hardly ever the case; for, put yourself upon analysing one of these words, and you must reduce it from one set of general words to another, and then into the simple abstracts and aggregates, in a much longer series than may be at first imagined, before any real idea emerges to light, before you come to discover any thing like the first principles of such compositions; and, when you have made such a discovery of the original ideas, the effect of the composition is utterly lost. A train of thinking of this sort is much too long to be pursued in the ordinary ways of conversation: nor is it at all necessary that it should. Such words are in reality but mere sounds; but they are sounds, which being used on particular occasions, wherein we receive some good, or suffer some evil; or see others affected with good or evil; or which we hear applied to other interesting things or events; and, being applied in such a variety of cases, that we know readily by habit to what things they belong, they produce in the mind, whenever

SECT. III.—GENERAL WORDS BEFO

MR. LOCKE has somewhere observ
usual sagacity, that most general wor
longing to virtue and vice, good and evi
are taught before the particular modes
which they belong, are presented to th
with them the love of the one and th
of the other; for the minds of childre
tile, that a nurse, or any person abou
seeming pleased or displeased with a
even any word, may give the disposi
child a similar turn. When, afterward
occurrences in life come to be appl
words, and that which is pleasant o
under the name of evil, and what is
to nature is called good and virtuous. a

by the breath of others ; and, for this reason, it is hard to repeat certain sets of words, though owned by themselves unoperative, without being in some degree affected, especially if a warm and affecting tone of voice accompanies them ; as suppose,

Wise, valiant, generous, good, and great.

These words, by having no application, ought to be unoperative ; but when words, commonly sacred to great occasions, are used, we are affected by them even without the occasions. When words, which have been so generally applied, are put together without any rational view, or in such manner that they do not rightly agree with each other, the style is called bombast. And it requires, in several cases, much good sense and experience to be guarded against the force of such language ; for, when propriety is neglected, a greater number of these affecting words may be taken into the service, and a greater variety may be indulged in combining them.

SECT. IV.—THE EFFECT OF WORDS.

IF words have all their possible extent of power, three effects arise in the mind of the hearer. The first is the *sound* ; the second, the *picture*, or representation of the thing signified by the sound ; the third is the *affection* of the soul produced by one or by both of the foregoing. *Compound abstract* words, of which we have been speaking (honour, justice, liberty, and the like) produce the first and the last of these effects, but not the second. *Simple abstracts* are used to signify some one simple idea without much adverting to others which may chance to attend it, as blue, green, hot, cold, and the like : these are capable of affecting all three of the purposes of words ; as the aggregate words, man.

times any such picture is formed, as there is most commonly a particular imagination for that purpose. But words operate, as I said of the composition, not by presenting any image to the having, from use, the same effect mentioned, that their original has when. Suppose we were to read a passage 'The river Danube rises in a moist and fertile soil in the heart of Germany, where it waters several principalities, flowing into Austria, and leaving the way it passes into Hungary; there, with its waters augmented by the Saave and the Elbe, it enters the Christiandom, and rolling through the countries which border on Tartary, it empties many mouths into the Black Sea.' In this mention many things are mentioned, rivers, cities, the sea, &c. But let any

in such a manner as to answer the purposes of life; nor is it necessary that we should.

SECT. V.—EXAMPLES THAT WORDS MAY AFFECT
WITHOUT RAISING IMAGES.

I FIND it very hard to persuade several that their passions are affected by words from whence they have no ideas; and yet harder to convince them, that, in the ordinary course of conversation, we are sufficiently understood without raising any images of the things concerning which we speak. It seems to be an odd subject of dispute with any man, whether he has ideas in his mind or not. Of this, at first view, every man, in his own forum, ought to judge without appeal. But, strange as it may appear, we are often at a loss to know what ideas we have of things, or whether we have any ideas at all upon some subjects. It even requires a good deal of attention to be thoroughly satisfied on this head. Since I wrote these papers I found two very striking instances of the possibility there is that a man may hear words without having any idea of the things which they represent, and yet afterward be capable of returning them to others, combined in a new way, and with great propriety, energy, and instruction. The first instance is that of Mr. Blacklock, a poet blind from his birth. Few men blessed with the most perfect sight can describe visual objects with more spirit and justness than this blind man; which cannot possibly be attributed to his having a clearer conception of the things he describes than is common to other persons. Mr. Spence, in an elegant preface which he has written to the works of this poet, reasons very ingeniously, and I imagine, for the most part, very rightly, upon the cause

seeing in its full perfection. Here i
less as much affected by his own
any that reads them can be; and y
with this strong enthusiasm by thin
neither has, nor can possibly have
ther than that of a bare sound: an
those who read his works be affect
manner that he was, with as little o
of the things described? The secon
Mr. Sanderson, professor of math
university of Cambridge. This les
acquired great knowledge in natural
astronomy, and whatever sciences
mathematical skill. What was the
nary, and the most to try my purp
cellent lectures upon light and co
man taught others the theory of the
they had, and which he himself ur

thing but what we do every day in common discourse. When I wrote this last sentence, and used the words *every day* and *common discourse*, I had no images in my mind of any succession of time; nor of men in conference with each other; nor do I imagine that the reader will have any such ideas on reading it. Neither, when I spoke of red, or blue and green, as well as refrangibility, had I these several colours, or the rays of light passing into a different medium, and there diverted from their course, painted before me in the way of images. I know very well that the mind possesses a faculty of raising such images at pleasure; but then an act of the will is necessary to this; and, in ordinary conversation or reading, it is very rarely that any image at all is excited in the mind. If I say, 'I shall go to Italy next summer,' I am well understood. Yet, I believe, nobody has by this painted in his imagination the exact figure of the speaker passing by land or by water, or both; sometimes on horseback, sometimes in a carriage; with all the particulars of the journey. Still less has he any idea of Italy, the country to which I proposed to go; or of the greenness of the fields, the ripening of the fruits, and the warmth of the air, with the change from this to a different season, which are the ideas for which the word *summer* is substituted: but least of all has he any image from the word *next*; for this word stands for the idea of many summers, with the exclusion of all but one: and surely the man who says *next summer*, has no images of such a succession and such an exclusion. In short, it is not only of ideas which are commonly called abstract, and of which no image at all can be formed, but even of particular real beings, that we converse without having any idea of them ex-

which is the most powerful of all po-
ments, would frequently lose its force
its propriety and consistency, if the se-
were always excited. There is
in the whole *Æneid*, a more grand
passage than the description of *Vulca-
Ætna*, and the works that are there
Virgil dwells particularly on the form
thunder, which he describes unfinished
hammers of the Cyclops. But what a
ples of this extraordinary composition

*Tres imbris torti radios, tres nubes aquosas
Addiderant; rutili tres ignis et altis astra
Fulgores nunc terrificos sonitumque metu
Miscebant operi, flammisque sequacibus*

This seems to be admirably sublime
attend coolly to the kind of sensible
a combination of ideas of this sort in
chimeras of madmen cannot appear more
absurd than such a picture. These

effect, or associated in any natural way, they may be moulded together in any form, and perfectly answer their end. The picturesque connexion is not demanded; because no real picture is formed; nor is the effect of the description at all the less upon this account. What is said of Helen by Priam and the old men of his council, is generally thought to give us the highest possible idea of that fatal beauty :

Οὐ νεμεσις Τρώας καὶ εὐκνημίδας Ἀχαιοὺς,
Τοιῇ δ' ἀμφὶ γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀλγέα πάσχει
Αἰνῶς δ' ἀθανάτοισι θεῇ εἰς ὤπα εὐκιν.

They cried, No wonder such celestial charms
For nine long years have set the world in arms :
What winning graces! what majestic mien!
She moves a goddess, and she looks a queen.—*Pope.*

Here is not one word said of the particulars of her beauty; nothing which can in the least help us to any precise idea of her person: but yet we are much more touched by this manner of mentioning her, than by those long and laboured descriptions of Helen, whether handed down by tradition, or formed by fancy, which are to be met with in some authors. I am sure it affects me much more than the minute description which Spenser has given of Belphebe; though I own that there are parts in that description, as there are in all the descriptions of that excellent writer, extremely fine and poetical. The terrible picture which Lucretius has drawn of Religion, in order to display the magnanimity of his philosophical hero in opposing her, is thought to be designed with great boldness and spirit :

Humana ante oculos fœdè cum vitâ jaceret,
In terris oppressa gravi sub religione,
Quæ caput e cœli regionibus ostendebat
Horribili desuper visu mortalibus instans;
Primus Grævus homo mortales tollere contra
Est oculos aures

well as painting does : their business rather by sympathy than imitation ; rather the effect of things on the mind or of others, than to present a clear image of things themselves. This is their province, and that in which they suc-

SECT. VI.—POETRY NOT STRICTLY
IMITATIVE ART.

HENCE we may observe, that poetry in the most general sense, cannot with strictness be called an art of imitation. It is indeed so far as it describes the manners of men, which their words can express, that it is imitative : *motus effert interprete lingua* : there is imitation ; and all merely *dramatic* poetry. But *descriptive* poetry operates chiefly by the means of sounds, which produce the effect of *melodies*. Nothing is as

that eloquence and poetry are as capable, nay indeed much more capable, of making deep and lively impressions, than any other arts, and even than nature itself in very many cases. And this arises chiefly from these three causes: First, that we take an extraordinary part in the passions of others, and that we are easily affected and brought into sympathy by any tokens which are shewn of them; and there are no tokens which can express all the circumstances of most passions so fully as words; so that if a person speaks upon any subject, he cannot only convey the subject to you, but likewise the manner in which he is himself affected by it. Certain it is, that the influence of most things on our passions is not so much from the things themselves, as from our opinions concerning them; and these again depend very much on the opinions of other men, conveyable, for the most part, by words only. Secondly, there are many things of a very affecting nature, which can seldom occur in the reality; but the words which represent them often do; and thus they have an opportunity of making a deep impression and taking root in the mind, whilst the idea of the reality was transient; and to some, perhaps, never really occurred in any shape, to whom it is, notwithstanding, very affecting, as war, death, famine, &c. Besides, many ideas have never been at all presented to the senses of any men but by words, as God, angels, devils, heaven, and hell, all of which have, however, a great influence over the passions. Thirdly, by words we have it in our power to make such combinations as we cannot possibly do otherwise. By this power of combining, we are able, by the addition of well chosen circumstances, to give a new life and force to the simple object. In painting, we may represent any fine figure we please;

idea, but these
sensible image did; which is all I c
picture of Priam dragged to the altar;
murdered, if it were well executed, v
edly be very moving; but there are v
circumstances which it could never

Sanguine sedentem quos ipse sacro

As a farther instance, let us consid
Milton, where he describes the trav
angels through their dismal habitat

—O'er many a dark and dreary val
They pass'd, and many a region dolorou
O'er many a frozen, many a fiery Alp;
Rocks, caves, lakes, fens, bogs, dens, and
A universe of death.

Here is displayed the force of union


Rocks, caves, lakes, dens, bogs, fens, an
which yet would lose the greatest p
if they were not the

—

... regards the
adming; the latter belongs to the passion
describes a thing as it is; the other de
s it is felt. Now, as there is a moving t
ce, an impassioned countenance, an a
ture, which affect independently of the
ut which they are exerted; so there are
certain dispositions of words, which,
diarily devoted to passionate subjects, a
s used by those who are under the infl
ny passion, touch and move us more
; which far more clearly and distinctl
the subject matter. We yield to symp
we refuse to description. The truth is
l description, merely as naked descrip
h ever so exact, conveys so poor and ins
an idea of the thing described, that it c
ly have the smallest effect, if the speaker
l in to his aid those modes of speech
strong and lively

therefore express themselves in a passionate manner.—If the affect is conveyed, it will work its effect without any idea at all of the originally given rise to it.

It might be expected, from the subject, that I should consider the sublime and beautiful, more than must be observed, that in this often and well handled already design to enter into the criticism and beautiful in any art, but to establish such principles as may tend to a judicious, and to form a sort of standard, which purposes I thought might justify an inquiry into the properties of nature as raise love and astonish by showing in what manner they produce these passions. Words were



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